

A Myth Retold:

How *Till We Have Faces* confirms that a Myth is not a Fairytale

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Introduction

“I have been a lover of fairy-stories since I learned to read, and have at times thought about them, I have not studied them professionally. I have been hardly more than a wandering explorer (or trespasser) in the land; full of wonder but not of information” J.R.R Tolkien “On Faerie Stories” (33).

In the quotation above Tolkien uses the term fairy-stories, which is arguably different from the fairytale or folktale, which is also very different from myth. These terms as of late have been used interchangeably. However, they are not the same. If anything, Tolkien’s term fairy-story is a middle ground for understanding the differences between fairytales and myth. In some respect his understanding of fairy-stories encompasses both fairytale and myth. And as Tolkien and C. S. Lewis tackle the world of fairy-stories they are forced to explore fairytales and myth in very strict context. Nevertheless, the distinctions that these men made about fairytale and myth have been lost in a sea of a larger category of fairytales and modern fantasy stories that use mythic symbols of creatures and magic rather carelessly.

Myth is more than a body of literature associated with Greco-Roman culture and religion or even other old and almost forgotten cultures of antiquity such as Norse, Hindi, and Aztec. Because of this connection, myth, somewhere between the stories of creation and modernity, has been used interchangeably with the concept of falsehoods and tall-tales. Myth was once regarded as the story that simultaneously and paradoxically transcends common perceptions of reality even as it reveals something about man, nature, and the divine. But myth has been dropped haphazardly into the category of the ordinary fairy or folk tale, as is demonstrated by Maria von Franz who did not even call the traditional Greek myth of Cupid and Psyche a myth, but blatantly referred to it as a fairytale (*The Golden Ass of Apuleius: The Liberation*, 77). As myths

have faded into fairytales, they have become trivial, juvenile, and childish ceasing to be mythic—a Walt Disney world of the commercially cute and mundane.

In the last fifty years or so, the study of myth and meaning has changed into the study of fairytales, and into world of non-meaning. But because myths are classified with fairytales, their depth and somber meaning are clouded with the various happy endings of fairytales. Myths, then, are stripped and analyzed the same way as fairytales, for critics do not perceive a distinction; therefore, when discussing modern fairytale criticism the conclusions are invariably applied to myths as well. Fairytales and myth suffer greatly from the modern views; both are lost in a world of criticism set on satisfying its own agenda. Literary criticism has stolen meaning out of words with deconstruction. Feminism rewrites the fairytales to liberate the women trapped in happily-ever-afters. Marxism blames the princes for being rich, turning any struggle into a social-economic statement. Such criticism and analysis leave out so much of what makes a fairytale a tale worth telling and a myth worth believing. It is as Tolkien said: fairy-stories (fairytales and myth) are more than just “information” and criticism as of late has looked only for the information and lost the wonder of the story that is being told.

Because of the new definitions and their focus on Marxism, feminism, and psycho-analysis, and the older definitions that focus on meaning, function, and ritual, critics are confused as to where a work of literature such as *Till We Have Faces* should fit in. Is it a fairytale; is it a myth? Are the two mutually exclusive? Modern critics have argued that myth is a sub-category to the fairytale genre. While, studying the older critics is it obvious that myth is the greater literary form. In an attempt to come to terms with the new criticism and understand the old terms, the following case study has been developed.

Modern criticism is analyzed along with the older criticism and the modern definitions compared to the former definition. To accentuate the point, several versions of the classical Cupid and Psyche / Beauty and the Beast story will be analyzed in conjunction with both new and former criticism. The three primary texts are the *Golden Ass* by Apuleius, *Beauty* by Robin McKinley and *Till We have Faces: A Myth Retold* by C. S. Lewis. Apuleius is generally known to have created the first literary form of the Cupid and Psyche story and McKinley's version, though is not necessarily the most recent, her version is consistent with how the Beauty and the Beast motif is presented in modern literature and criticism. Lewis's retelling of the myth is a masterful work that was written at the height of myth criticism before fairytales became the prominent literary and critical form. Since *Till We Have Faces* comes at such a time as myth criticism on the verge of becoming fairytale criticism, Lewis's story becomes a fulcrum – the point where myth and fairytale meet. Lewis uses the strongest aspects of both myth and fairytale in his story. In doing so, Lewis demonstrates that one literary form is better than the other, and certain definitions of fairytale are inaccurate to define myth.

Story Synopsis: Cupid and Psyche / Beauty and the Beast

Since there are so many various versions of these stories, it is advantageous for there to be a general consensus on which story plots and structures are being analyzed. When either one of the stories is referenced these are the basic elements that are being traced. The basic narrative structure for *Cupid and Psyche* and *Beauty and the Beast* are as follows:

Cupid and Psyche: A King has three beautiful daughters. One is far fairer than the other two; her name is Psyche. The commoners start to worship Psyche. This provokes the goddess Aphrodite or Venus (depending on who is telling the story). Aphrodite demands that the girl be sacrificed. Aphrodite's son Cupid or Eros falls madly in love with the girl and rescues her. He

takes her to his palace. But he tells Psyche that she cannot look at him and he only comes in the dead of night. Psyche wishes to tell her family, namely her sisters that she is all right. Cupid allows the sisters to visit. The sisters upon seeing the wonders that their sister has, become jealous and plot to ruin her. They convince Psyche to sneak a peek on her sleeping husband. Psyche complies and one night she takes a lamp and looks at him. She is overcome by the beauty of her god-husband and she looks too long. Oil from her lamp spills on him and he awakens. Seeing that his beloved has betrayed him he sends her away and he retreats to his mother's house to nurse his wound. Aphrodite seeing the pain of her son, determines to punish Psyche more. She gives impossible tasks to the girl—separate a pile of mixed grains, collect golden fleece, and bring back a box from Dis. Psyche does all of these tasks with the supernatural aid. And during her last task Cupid himself comes to her rescue again and they are reunited and wed properly.

Beauty and the Beast: There is a merchant who has three daughters, one of whom is far more fairer than the other two; her name is Beauty. The merchant falls on hard times. He leaves to go on a journey hoping to return with better fortune. He asks each of his daughters what they would like. One wanted a new gown, one said pearls, and Beauty said she wanted nothing, but a rose. The merchant failed in his endeavors to increase his fortunes and on his way home he became lost in the wood. He discovers a palace with no visible servants, but there are lights and a warm fire and a meal magically appears for him. He stays the night. The next morning on his way out he sees a rose garden. He thinks of his lovely daughter's wish and he plucks one to take home with him. The Beast appears and demands retribution for the theft of the rose—either the man's life or the life of his daughter. The merchant is sent home with the rose and the dreadful news. Beauty, out of love for her father, goes to live in the palace with the Beast. She must never leave the Beast, and she can never see her family again. She suffers the loss of her family and

must endure the nightly request from the Beast for her hand in marriage. Since she does not love him, she cannot marry him. Beauty is finally overcome with her grief and asks permission to go home to visit. The Beast lets her go because he loves her, but he knows that if she does not return in a week he will die. Beauty barely makes it back to the Beast in time, and as he lay dying, she confesses her love for him. He asks her to marry him one last time, and she says yes. The Beast is transformed into the man he once was. Beauty and the Beast are united in matrimony.

Chapter 1: Definition of Myth—Truth over Fairytale

Fairytales are not myths and myths are not fairytales, and every argument within both these forms does not boil down to the oppression of women, the disfranchising of the lower classes, or the evils of sexual repression. This is not to say that myths and fairytales are not similar or that they cannot deal with such issues as class, social conventions, and marriage. Nevertheless, these readings are too often dominantly political in nature and so prevalent in modern criticism of fairytales—and, therefore, myth—that they distract the reader from plumbing the stories in question for more perennial meanings apart from the modern concern with the politics of power and nihilism; hence they need to be reevaluated.

Each term—fairy tale and myth—needs to be broken down into its basic components so that its fundamental elements can be evaluated and understood as separate forms. This must be done because as of late critics in the realm of literature have only looked at myth as a subcategory of the larger defined fairytale. Critics such as Maria von Franz and Ruth Bottigheimer have not given myth the close examination it deserves and merely place myth in the study of fairytales. However, myth is not merely a literary form. It is a concept that theologians, psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers all have something to say about because of its connection to the human experience and worldview. Fairytales to some extent do the same thing but not to the same end, which is why myth cannot be a subcategory; it is too powerful a form to be subjugated. Once a firm understanding of the distinction of myth and fairytale has been established, then one can look at a work of literature and consider its place within these genres. A piece of literature such as *Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold* by C. S. Lewis is altogether confusing unless fairytale and myth are separate. Jack Zipes postulates that classic “myths” have been turned into fairytales, and Lewis declares with his title that he can

take a story that has been fairytaled and still tell a myth. But without knowing what a myth means or understanding what makes a story a fairytale, none of these arguments or assertions makes any sense when analyzing a text. Also, one must consider the author's own understanding of these categories. Fortunately, Lewis in numerous essays explained his understanding on both of these categories.

Before explaining myth as something other than fairytale, fairytales must be firmly defined. The world of fairytale seems to include the realms of folktales, folklore, fairytales and stories about fairies. Even within the genre itself, there are minor discrepancies in definitions, causing overlap within the definitions. Such variations within the genre make clear definitions difficult. Tolkien explains some of the frustration about defining something like fairy stories in his study, "On Faerie Stories":

You will turn to the *Oxford English Dictionary* in vain. It contains no reference to the combination *fairy-story*, and is unhelpful on the subject of *fairies* generally. In the Supplement, *fairy-tale* is recorded since the year 1750, and its leading sense is said to be (a) a tale about fairies, or generally a fairy legend; with developed senses, (b) an unreal or incredible story, and (c) a falsehood. (Tolkien 34)

These are the elementary definitions of fairy stories, and weak ones at that. To say that a fairy story is merely a falsehood is in and of itself a false statement. But, it is evident that the definition of the fairytale is not forthcoming in the dictionary. There must be more to the story than just the element of having a fairy or a legend about fairies. Such a definition is very limiting and demands the question: what is a fairy? Snow White does not have fairies in it; can it be a fairytale? Do mythical creatures, such as fauns, the hydra, or even the Greek gods themselves,

fall into the fairytale genre? These questions have been answered by several critics in various fields of study.

Part of the problem with the defining process is that there are so many items, themes, creatures, and structural formulas that are all similar. A folktale, a fairytale, a myth, a fantasy story that has fairies in it—each one of these categories has at some point been labeled as the same thing. They have also all had critics that claim they are separate. Jack Zipes for instance likes to make a clear distinction between folk tales and fairy tales (*Breaking* 9-10), and claims that Tolkien “misinterprets the meaning of the folk and fairy tales. He, too, reduces the categories of the folk and fairy tale so they become indistinct, and he underestimates the value of historical anthropological studies about the evolution of the folk tale” (160). It is obvious that Zipes feels rather strongly about the separation of folk and fairytale; however, folk and fairytale are often studied in tandem.

Zipes also points out in *Fairy Tale as Myth: Myth as Fairy Tale*, that there is evidence of the early blending of myth and folk tales in the oral tradition (3). Clearly there are connections between all of these literary forms. The question is; what are their distinctions. It is Zipes hypothesis that “over the centuries we have transformed the ancient myths and folk tales and made them into the fabric of our lives” (*Fairy Tale as Myth* 4). He argues that people on an unconscious level do not even recognize the difference because these myths and folk tales have become fairytales.

Zipes – Fairytales as social conventions

Fairytales, according to Zipes, were first told in the oral tradition as folk tales: “they were intended to explain natural occurrences such as the change of the seasons and shifts in the weather or to celebrate the rites of harvestings, hunting, marriage, and conquest” (*Fairy Tale as*

Myth 10). These tales are not anything special; if anything, they are generic and mundane. This is because the stories come from the commonality of the social experience.

Zipes, coming from a Marxist perspective, also argues that the folk tales “were tales of initiation, worship, warning, and indoctrination” (10). Yet, that is not the whole truth of the matter. For all his claims that folk and fairytales must be considered separately, Zipes does not allow for the differences in folktales and myths. His own examples prove that he has difficulty coming to terms with the ritual and religious origins, namely the mythic, of fairytales and folktales: “Shakespeare’s plays were enriched by folk tales, and one could return to Homer and the Greek dramatists to trace the importance of folk-tale motifs in the formation of enduring cultural creation” (*Breaking the Spell of Magic* 9). Later he discusses the “Beauty and the Beast” motif, how it “can be traced back to primitive fertility rites” (10). Zipes’s vague references and poor definitions may be due to the fact that myth calls on an understanding of a higher authority than the governing body and this is difficult for Marxist to come to terms with.

Nevertheless, Zipes does talk about myth, However, he does not discuss it in the context that most people are familiar with, but in relation to how today’s society views the notion of the classical fairytales, which he claims have been mythified. The mythification processes is one that takes a tale and elevates it to the status of transcendent universality. In other words, myth is universal, and fairytale, which was once a folk tale, is a tale that is specific to a select community, according to Zipes interpretation of the genres.

Bottigheimer – Definitions that do not define

However, Ruth Bottigheimer in *Fairy Tale, a New History*, writes her own interpretations for defining fairytales. She recognizes the challenge that this genre faces; thus, she breaks down fairytales into five categories. In this way she avoids having to come up with a solid definition of

the term by itself. Bottigheimer is also operating under the understanding that folk tales, fairy tales, and myth are only subcategories or sub-definitions to the larger term fairytale.

Bottigheimer's first category is the folk tale, which "deal[s] with familiar aspects of the human condition" (Bottigheimer 4). Under her classification, folktales do not use magic and do not have happy endings. She agrees with Zipes that folktales oftentimes have their roots in some types of myths. However, the lack of the supernatural element in the folk tale separates it from the fairytale and the myth.

The second group of the fairytale genre is the magic stories, which necessarily by Bottigheimer's standards contain the supernatural. Bottigheimer's examples of these are urban legends, legends, and religious stories such as those found in the Bible: "In these examples the fantastic, the divine, the magical, the miraculous, and the transformative produced examples of awe of the other-worldly, examples of divine power and divine truth" (Bottigheimer 5). In essence, magic tales are the substance of myths. However, in this category Bottigheimer has done something very strange. She has made all magic supernatural by connecting magic with religious tales. While in the same instance, she has made all divine elements magically mundane by linking religious tales with urban legends and ghost stories. Thus, magic as she has described divests the supernatural of its transcendental character. Not only does such an action elevate magic from the plane of incantations and wands, but it devalues the power of divinity. To call the act of any god merely magic is to misunderstand the nature of divine power. Urban legends that do not necessarily contain elements of the divine are haphazardly compared to and associated with stories about miracle healings and divine revelation, such as what are found in religious texts, namely the Bible. It is one thing to place no longer practiced religious stories and rites under this category; it is another to blatantly discredit a particular religion and not address the

others that follow similar “mythology” such as the Koran or the Torah. This is an ill explained and defined category. Bottigheimer appears not know what to do with the divine, the supernatural, and the myth, so she labeled it magic and snuck it in with the hocus-pocus and wand-waving. Bottigheimer has covered up myth in the guise of magic tales; therefore, her second category demonstrates that the myth has lost its power and identity.

Bottigheimer calls her third group simply the fairytale. In general she avoids the issue of oral fairytales versus literary fairytales because she believes that the debate is used “only to advance an unprovable theory of oral origins and transmission” (8). She claims that the term fairytale is actually a misinterpretation of the *Grimm’s Fairytales*, whose “original title, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (Nursery and Household Tales), had no fairies in its brief wording” (8). Regardless of the misunderstanding, the term has stuck; thus, “most definitions of fairy tales center on the tale’s structure and component motifs” (9). However, Bottigheimer argues that it is not the motif, structure, or happy endings (normally a wedding) of fairytales that make them fairytales, but their “overall plot trajectory of individual tales in conjunction with those fairy tale elements all brought together within a ‘compact’ narrative...All this together creates a fairy tale as we know it in the modern world and as it first appeared in the sixteenth century” (9). She would include some medieval romances within this group. This supposed definition of fairytale is more of an explanation of how the tale is told, than what a fairytale is. She is also concerned with the length of the tale, yet, Bottigheimer does not tell how long is too long. So her interpretation still leaves the reader wondering when a romance with all the motifs, structure, and narrative form of a fairytale ceases to be a fairytale once it has reached a certain length. This is an important question when looking at novels that are retellings of classic fairytales: do they lose their fairytale status because of a page count? And where does Spenser’s *Faerie Queen* fit in?

Needless to say, Bottigheimer's definition promotes more questions than it answers when it comes to fairytales.

However, Bottigheimer has two more categories that provide an explanation for the narrative elements. The fourth and fifth groups are the "restoration" fairytales and the "rise" fairytales. The restoration fairytales take place wholly in the realm of the natural world and are normally about princesses and princes who are "driven away from home and heritage," undergo adventures and trials with only a hint of magic, and return home or are wed, thus restoring them to their rightful social and political positions (Bottigheimer 10). The rise fairytales, on the other hand, are about the poor and suffering who, through the means of magic, are brought to wealth and a happy ending (Bottigheimer 11). What is most interesting about these last two categories is the fact that magic is almost always involved in both. Bottigheimer does not classify these tales as magic tales even though the use of magic appears to be similar to her second category. Therefore, what is the real difference between the "magic tales" and the "restoration/rise" fairytales, because it is obviously not the magic?

Bottigheimer's classification of fairytales is rather weak; however, she has one of the most concise modern definitions. Her main concern about fairytales is the narrative structure partially because it follows through with her thesis, which states that the oral tradition of fairytales is a little more exaggerated than critics first were willing to believe. She argues that the popularity of fairytales at the time in which literacy and printing was on the rise is not coincidental (Bottigheimer 28). This can be seen in the structure of the fairytales, and it is also why folktales and magic tales (myths) have to be separated out of the overarching genre of fairytales, at least according to Bottigheimer. However, Bottigheimer does not take the separation far enough. She, whether knowingly or not, does not realize that the distinctions she

made with the use of magic in the magic tales and the use of magic in the rise and restoration fairytales are not different enough to warrant the kind of distinctions that she gave them. Her conclusions on the matter only reveal half of the truth.

Fairytales – the Jungian approach

Another critic who writes on the topic of fairytale and myth is Marie von Franz, who approaches the genres from a predominantly Jungian and feminist perspective. Franz defines fairytales for their contents, arguing that “every fairy tale is a relatively closed system compounding one essential psychological meaning, which is expressed in a series of symbolic pictures and events and is discoverable in these” (Franz, *The Interpretation* 2) While Bottigheimer was concerned with the narrative structure of the tale, Franz is concerned with the narrative voice. She wants to know and understand what the tale can show through symbol, theme, and motif. Franz comes to the conclusion that “all fairy tales endeavor to describe one and the same psychic fact, but a fact so complex and far-reaching and so difficult for us to realize in all its different aspects that hundreds of tales and thousands of repetitions with a musician’s variations are needed until this unknown fact is delivered into consciousness; and even then the theme is not exhausted” (2). This psychic fact is what Franz calls the soul of the fairytale.

In other writings by Franz, she explains more of what she means when she talks about the soul of the fairytale. For her the soul of the tale marks the distinction between fairytale and myth, asserting that in fairytales the hero or heroine “are much less human, that is, they have no inner humane life of the psyche” (Franz, *The Psychological* 9). She goes on to explain that the characters in a fairytale are rather like “black and white shapes, they are like clichés, with a very characteristic trend such as cleverness, capacity for suffering, loyalty, etc., and the figures stay so

to the end of the story” (10). This is not the case with the mythic hero, who is frequently forced to change his attitude or perspective on the situation or even himself.

In other words, there is a type of stagnation to a fairytale character. There is no growth, only suffering, waiting, and rescue, none of which actually develop the nature or soul of the character. An example of this is Snow White, who must work at menial tasks for the dwarves, while waiting for her prince to come. She does not do anything to find him or encourage him. The Prince simply shows up to kiss her awake. Snow White spends her entire life reacting to actions done to her, never taking the initiative that would require choice, revelation, personal growth and learning, integral parts of myth and mythic heroes and heroines.

Regardless of Franz’s efforts in some of her definitions to make a distinction between fairytale and myth, when it comes to particular analysis she uses the words interchangeably and often in favor of the term fairytale. This is seen most notably in *The Golden Ass of Apuleius: The Liberation of the feminine in Man* when she refers to the myth of Cupid and Psyche as a fairytale—a story within a story, which is like a dream (77). As has been seen in other examples, she is not the only critic to do so. Franz, like Zipes, in one respect talks about fairytales according to her definitions, while her conclusions are not compatible with her own definitions. Franz and Zipes have made the original myths merely folklore and part of superstitions. Myths are only a cog in the wheel of history that create culture and cultural identity. Whether in Zipes’s ritual or Franz’s folklore, truth is found in the things that culture decides to give meaning to, and not found in the ritual or lore. That is to say, the culture gives meaning to the ritual and not the ritual that gives meaning to the culture. This is a fine distinction, but key to understanding how the critics have gone wrong in the defining process concerning myth and fairytales. If the culture gives the ritual meaning, then myth is nothing but a story. But if the ritual is what gives the

culture meaning, then the myth is something more than a story. It is a piece of truth that needs to be preserved. The distinction is in the relativity of the tale. In Zipes's and Franz's interpretations the ritual and lore are relative to how the culture thinks. However, if the story is not relative to the culture, then the myth has a transcendent quality that will make it relative to all cultures and all times.

As is seen in Franz's study of fairytales, she is strongly influenced by her own study of psychology. Psychology has found its niche in literary criticism. In fact, it is nearly impossible to look for studies on fairytales and not look at Freud or Jung. These men saw fairytales as a means of understanding humanity, society, and social interactions. Bruno Bettelheim, a child psychologist, used fairytales as therapy because he saw how children found "meaning through fairytales," meaning that leads to truth that was not necessarily taught in real life (5). Such interpretations of fairytales have led to the clustering of myth with fairytales because they share a common ability to communicate truth. However, the kind of truth that is revealed marks the two genres as different. Fairytales reveal "symbolic depiction of social realities" (Zipes, *Breaking the Magic Spell* 6). They do not reveal truth about the abstract or religious practices.

Sadly, most of the critics we have looked at do not see myth as being something other than an element of the fairytale, or if they do, they have difficulty following through with their analysis. This is in part due to a greater issue concerning the modern mindset, which Joseph Campbell exemplifies in his discussions about myth. Coming from an evolutionary perspective, myths are merely stories that explain a part of our human experience. Even though he acknowledges the aspects of mystery in myth, he does not hold to the validity of the mystery (Campbell 23). The fundamental problem is the lack of belief in something transcendent and therefore in meaning within the myths themselves, because inherent in a myth is the mystery of

the divine. And in a post-modern, existentialist world where humans are asserting their own godness, there is no room for the mystery of something greater than man. Campbell can approach myth only as a social curiosity that man used as he was evolving to explain aspects of his human experience that he could not in his limited mind understand. It is Campbell's unspoken argument that man has been enlightened to the follies of myth and mystery and is beyond the need for God. This is the argument that Nietzsche postulated in his many writings: the *übermensch* who is the answer unto himself—the modern man. So this modern conception of man, which started out as a philosophical notion has morphed into not only an idea but *the* ideal. And fairytales—merely stories of a particular length and structure with common motifs that express the human experience in terms of wish fulfillment—take over the stories that try to explain more than the human experience and answer the questions about man himself, which are myths.

Myth

Myth from the Greek term *mythos* means “utterance” or story. Myth is also contrasted with *logos*, word, which has deeper connotations of reason and truth. The concept of myth, then, was not just words but the story that they produced (Kirk, *Nature* 23). This notion of story is not such as one would find in the modern novel or the modern fairytale. Story for the Greeks, for Homer, was a matter of knowing the past and acknowledging the present so that one could face the future. Myth is the story of what *is*, what is *reality*. The stories that myths tell are about the reality of man and his condition.

In this context myths cannot mean falsehood but are the great story, a story that has weighty elements and meditates on the severity of life. The idea of severity is not tragic per se; it is heavy because of the subject matter. Lewis calls it solemn or “*solempne*,” which should not automatically mean gloom and oppression. As Lewis explains, to truly recover its meaning “you

must think of a court ball, or a coronation, or a victory march, as these things appear to people who enjoy them; in an age when everyone puts on his oldest clothes to be happy in, you must re-awake the simpler state of mind in which people put on gold and scarlet to be happy in” (Lewis, *A Preface* 17). These events are saturated with meaning and yet they are enjoyable; so it is with myth. When one hears or reads a myth, “the experience may be sad or joyful but it is always grave. Comic myth (in my sense of *myth*) is impossible” (Lewis, *Experiment* 44).

Myth by nature is not only solemn but also allusive. The mythic story is a medium by which one communicates the abstraction of religion and the supernatural to a natural and literal world (Kirk, *Nature* 14). In myth the themes of the human condition manifest themselves, giving significance to the human existence. Kirk comments that the “Greek myths are strangely limited in their themes ... In particular they are substantially lacking in the obsession with the rules of social organization that is conspicuous in the myths of savage cultures” (Kirk, *Nature* 26), which would arguably contradict some of the fairytale critics such as Zipes and Franz. This is because they are not looking at myth as a means of understanding the human condition as it *is*, but as society and culture *wish* it to be. The ideal of the modern man does not like to consider human limitations and divine intervention found in myth. The modern man wishes to be beyond the need for a higher authority or governance of divinity. The modern man wishes for the princess to be saved by the perfect prince who will right all the wrongs in society. Fairytale is the wish fulfillment; myth is the reality.

Homeric Myth

The reality is that man is limited. He cannot be “like something more than a man,” as the Homeric heroes learn (Homer, *Iliad* 5. 436-443). They are limited by their own humanity. Homer’s heroes must understand this limitation if they are going to live out the battle and

become truly heroic. What makes the Homeric understanding of reality universal is the willingness and ability of the heroes to embrace their humanity and their fate. It is the fate of all men to die. There is no sugarcoating or “happily ever after,” only the stark reality of death and the limitations of a man’s existence. But the story that Homer tells is not one of despair over a man’s fate; it is one of honor and heroic deeds. Myth is the weighty matter of man’s fate, but it does not leave the man wallowing in misery. It reveals the nature of how a man should live in reality. This is not a mere social convention for Homer or for the many other myth-tellers; it goes deeper. In fact, it could be said that it goes to the soul of a man, but not the soul that Franz speaks of, which is just the self or intellect. This is the soul that lives on beyond the body. The divine mystery in Homer’s world is death and the passage of a man into the afterlife (Homer, *Iliad* 7.80). It is not a fairytale but religion. The rite of burning the dead is not a wish fulfillment; it is a sacred duty that requires sacrifices to the gods and ritual (23.161-249).

The Greeks also understood the inspiration of the divine. Homer consistently invokes the Muses to assist him in his recitations. Lewis describes the Homeric type of inspiration: “The poet has a chair placed for him and an instrument put into his hands. A table is set beside him with wine, there he may drink ‘when his heart desires.’ Presently without orders from the king, he begins his lay when the Muse prompts him; its three characteristics are that it is about men, it is historically true, and it is tragic” (Lewis, *A Preface* 14; Homer, *Odyssey* 8.65-79). Divine inspiration is serious, transcending the banality of the triviality of everyday life. The Muses are divinity that should not be invoked lightly. An invocation connects the story with religiosity and ritual. A story like Homer’s *Iliad* is in fact about men and history and tragedy but it goes beyond to connect men to the gods and the gods to men, which is a type of revelation.

However, Homer's epics cannot by necessity be the only examples. There are other stories that do not seem to fit the Homeric standard for myth, "tales like that of Paris abducting Helen, or Achilles killing Hector; or of the woman who puts off her suitors by a trick, or the other woman (or her father) who chooses her husband by a contest. The first two of these instances might be called 'legend', and the second two 'folktale', but the truth is that they all come within the range of what most people mean by 'myth', and yet seem to have no serious religious component whatever..." (Kirk, *Myth Its Meaning and Function* 11). This is because sacred myths do not have to have connections with particular ritual to still make the correlation with the divine or reveal something about the supernatural. This very aspect of myth is shown in Apuleius's *The Golden Ass*, when the tale of Cupid and Psyche is told to drawn on as a later allegory for the process of induction into mysteries of a goddess. The story itself is not part of the ritual or any other religious rites but it does provide divine understanding to the characters' later development.

Myth and the Critics

In Bottigheimer's classification of the tales of magic, she is very close to discovering that which makes a myth different. She has difficulty explaining that category because divine miracles and rites for the dead do not always fit well with the notion of fairy-godmothers waving wands. Bottigheimer incidentally found the most profound difference between fairytales and myth; religious tales do not and cannot fit into the context of fairytales—even though she tries. Yet the very fact that she has to create two separate understandings of magic to justify her definitions is proof that myths do not belong with the fairytales. The magic she defines in the magic tales category is divinely given or used. But the magic in the restoration and rise tales has no such origins and in many cases has no origins at all.

G. S. Kirk, in his writings about myth, is very clear when he gives the many-nuanced definitions of myth: myth is always defined with the understanding that religious rites and rituals are revealed, explained or understood through the myth (*Myth Its Meaning and Function* 23). Even though “something really ‘higher’ is occasionally glimpsed in mythology: Divinity, the right to power (as distinct from its possession), the due worship,” myth is still something other than religion (Tolkien 51). Indeed according to Tolkien and Andrew Lang, “religion and mythology (in the strict sense of that word) are two distinct things that have become inextricably entangled, though mythology is in itself almost devoid of religious significance” (Tolkien 51). However, Tolkien and Lang missed the connection and power of revelation in myth and how it works with the religious convictions and practices of the culture. Lewis also embraces Kirk’s concept of myth as Gibson in his book, *C. S. Lewis Spinner of Tales: a Guide to His Fiction*, insists:

Lewis did not believe that all pagan religions were completely empty of truth. In an essay titled ‘Religion without Dogma’ he speaks of the mass of mythology which has come down to us as having many sources mixed together—from history, allegory, ritual, and so on. But he suggests that some of the sources may also be supernatural—in fact, both diabolical and divine. The latter, he says, may be a *praeparatio evangelica*, a divine hint in the ritual or poetry which shadows forth the central truth declared clearly and historically in the incarnation. As already noted, he refers to these divine hints as the ‘good dreams’ which God had sent to man prior to the full revelation in Christ. (232)

Lewis and Kirk understand divine revelation as the key to what makes myth, myth. It is not magic but divine inspiration that set a myth apart from a fairytale. Tolkien and Lang are right to

assert that mythology is not religion, but that does not mean that myth cannot share aspects of the religious practices with culture and give understanding and meaning to mysteries not fully revealed.

Myth – the abstraction to concrete

Though myths are about what *is*, there is an amount of abstraction that confounds understanding what really is. Myths are about mysteries as the Homeric world proves. They are concrete images of the abstract world of divines and souls. Lewis discusses this conundrum in his essay “Myth Became Fact”:

Human intellect is incurably abstract. Pure mathematics is the type of successful thought. Yet the only realities we experience are concrete—this pain, this pleasure, this dog, this man. While we are loving the man, bearing the pain, enjoying the pleasure, we are not intellectually apprehending Pleasure, Pain or Personality... This is our dilemma—either to taste and not to know or to know and not to taste—or, more strictly, to lack one kind of knowledge because we are in an experience or to lack another kind because we are outside it. (*God in the Dock* 65)

The problem is that experience and intellectual understanding of the emotions cannot be accomplished in tandem. The abstract feelings that go with the experience do not allow for analysis. Feelings are understood through the experience. Lewis explains that myth is a type of solution to this problem: “In the enjoyment of a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction” (*God in the Dock* 66).

Aristotle calls the experience *catharsis* and Longinus calls it *ekstasis*. These two predominately emotional yet intellectual responses could “be regarded as two different manifestations of the same phenomenon, capable of existing separately or combined” (Henn 135). They are the

experience of the emotion brought on by the myth and the collective experience of the emotion, which the individual who has heard the myth can universally relate to. In the moments of catharsis and of ecstasy the abstract is made concrete and the myth imparts knowledge that is not originally understood. The emotional response illuminates the universality of the myth, showing how it affects the community.

The purpose of these emotional responses, at least in ancient Greece, which are inextricably associated with plays, tragedies and other stories told to the masses during religious festivals, were evidence that the people made a connection to their religious beliefs. The stories or plays were performed so that all could learn through the concrete form of the story the abstract knowledge or principle to meaning of life. Myths take the deep theological and philosophical questions about life and the divine and present them in a story as a system of symbols. Kirk explains: “myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is a system of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode; they are interdependent because they both ‘satisfy a group of identical or closely related needs of individuals’” (Kirk, *Myth* 24). Myth and rituals find commonality in their meaning and in what the community gains from understanding that meaning. Thus, “what flows into you from the myth” is more than just truth, it is reality. Unlike Zipes who thought that the culture gave value to the ritual, Lewis and Kirk argue that the rituals give value and understanding to the culture. Rituals and myths are not arbitrary events. They are performed to give truth and understanding to the things of this world that are not easily or readily understood: “truth is always *about* something, but reality is that *about which* truth is” (Lewis, *God on the Dock* 66). Myths testify to reality.

Myth and the Imagination – Lewis’s Definition of Myth

Continuing to struggle with the theoretical knowledge and the knowledge gained by experience, Lewis “found the key to its solution in a necessary contrast between reason and imagination. In experiential knowledge, he came to believe, the imagination plays as important a role as the intellect in theoretical knowledge. In the literary arts, Lewis found the imagination most profoundly at work in the creation of myth” (Segura73). This aspect concerning myth appears to contradict the previous assertions, but myth is part of the very source of imagination, that imagination cannot be without myth and myth cannot be without imagination. This goes against practically everything that the fairytale and modern critics have said about myth and its function in culture. Yet, upon further investigation of what Lewis and Tolkien meant by imagination, their assessments form a more solid definition and understanding of myth as a whole. But this can only be comprehended in terms of Lewis’s and Tolkien’s way of defining terms such as imagination, myth, and fairy.

In this sense imagination is closely linked to the Platonic notion of Form. Someone cannot imagine something out of nothing; it is imagined because the Form of it exists. For Lewis and Tolkien the ability to tap into the imagination and to experience the Form is to cross over into Faerie, or in the more mundane since of the word, fairyland. This is not the fairyland of imps and spirits or even the land where Titania holds court. This land does contain such creatures; however, it is much more than that.

To understand the power of the imagination in myth the reader must be willing to let it “get under our skin and hit us at a deeper level than our thoughts” (Segura 135). The mythic or imaginative way of expressing the truth is sometimes the better form of communication. It is a medium that is accessible to all ages; it is not limiting to the confines of our own world’s presuppositions and shortcomings; it is the means to asserting reason into disorder and chaos

(Lewis, *On Stories* 34-35). Lewis knows that imagination has a greater “role in the visual or literary or other arts, or in sciences, and it is the imagination, more than any other of our mental faculties that is most successful in perceiving and capturing the thing. This is because the imagination, in his words, is the organ of meaning” (Segura 74).

Meaning is not found in the mere calculation of fact and figures. Lewis does not and, for the purposes of writing, cannot separate reason from imagination. This is illustrated in Lewis's inability to explain himself outside of metaphor or allegory. For him, reason and logic are best expressed in the form of word pictures that reveal the true meaning that Lewis was attempting to explain, as is seen in the following passage:

All I want to use is the distinction between the author as author and the author as man, citizen, or Christian. What this comes to for me is that there are usually two reasons for writing as imaginative work, which may be called, Author's reason and the Man's. If only one of these is present, then, so far as I am concerned, the book will not be written. If the first is lacking, it can't; if the second is lacking, it shouldn't.

In the Author's mind there bubbles up every now and then the material for a story. For me it invariably begins with mental pictures. This ferment lends to nothing unless it is accompanied with the longing for a Form: verse or prose, short story, novel, play or what not. When these two things click you have the Author's impulse complete. It is now a thing inside him pawing to get out ... it is like being in love.

While the Author is in this state, the Man will of course have to criticize the proposed book from quite a different point of view. He will ask how the

gratification of this impulse will fit in with all the other things he wants, and ought to do or be. Perhaps the whole thing is too frivolous and trivial (from the Man's point of view, not the Author's) to justify the time and pains it would involve. Perhaps it would be unedifying when it was done. Or else perhaps (at this point the Author cheers up) it looks like being 'good', not in a merely literary sense, but 'good' all around. (*On Stories* 45-46).

Lewis is proposing the idea that reason and the imaginative process must work in tandem with each other for the story to come into being. Granted, Lewis is talking about all stories and in particular one of his favorite mediums of fantasy but this same logic can and is applicable to myth. Those that write myth are not only writing because the story fits the form, they know and understand the 'good' it has, the meaning that is expressed in it. Myth just so happens to be the best form.

Imagination according Lewis and Tolkien is also present in the primary world, which is the real world. Fairy is Tolkien's tool for explaining imagination but one could substitute Lewis's *Story* for Fairy. It is "the secondary imagination, employing language and metaphor, reworks and reshapes this primary world...the most exalted function of imagination as subcreation in linguistic form, creating, if successful, a secondary world" (Segura 81). This is a concept not unlike the idea of the divine poet and the muse but for Lewis, Tolkien, and any other number of authors of a similar persuasion the notion of creation is more intimately connected to the personhood of God. They believe that "the image of God in human beings [manifests] as imagination—as participation in God's creativity which brought the worlds into being. This participation is found in the sciences as well as the arts. In striking contrast, the traditional attribute of the image of God in human beings was reason, not imagination, which by George

MacDonald's time was perceived widely to be mechanistic rather than organic in operation" (Segura 83). But fortunately, Lewis, Tolkien, and MacDonald, are able to express themselves in their *mythic* worlds via the organic, living imagination, or, as Tolkien has argued, sub-creating in imitation of God Himself.

Imagining and creating, as Lewis and his colleagues understood it, are only the first step to understanding the importance of myth as a vehicle for transporting truth. If an author is able to produce a "good" and successful secondary world, it will by necessity reveal truths about the primary world. This is because the secondary world can only reflect the form and image of the primary imagination. Primary imagination and world are according to Lewis and Tolkien grounded in the reality of God and his first creative acts of our own creation. This is to some merely myth—the religious falsehood—but it is fundamental in comprehending the significance of myth. It is the only way to have any meaning in myth, creative acts, and imagination. Without the reality of God, it is like Lewis's allegory: the *Author as Author* cannot exist. The reality of God is that he is the first Author giving the first pictures of imagination to the author, without it the story cannot follow. The reality of God also influences the *Author as Man*. When the man denies the reality of God, the man lacks the first component to story-making. The reality of God and his creative acts give meaning to the author's creative acts. For "[e]ven the forms by which a person reveals his thoughts are not created by him in a primary sense; they belong to nature" (Segura 83), which is to say they belong to God. Therefore, the "central function of the imagination [an idea developed by Lewis] is the making of meaning, adding, as it were, to the real world. This making is strictly subordinate to the primary meaning put into his created reality by God" (Segura 84).

Imagination, myth, and meaning manifest themselves and come to completion in the Incarnation of Christ. This is a profound mystery, but this myth drives all other myths. It is the story that all other stories try to tell. Lewis explains his reasoning and enthusiasm for embracing such a philosophy:

We must not be ashamed of the mythical radiance resting on our theology. We must not be nervous about ‘parallels’ and ‘Pagan Christs’; they *ought* to be there—it would be a stumbling block if they weren’t. We must not, in false spirituality, withhold our imaginative welcome. If God chooses to be mythopoeic—and is not the sky itself a myth—shall we refuse to be *mythopathic*? For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Prefect Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and delight, addressed to the savage, the child, and the poet in each one of us no less than to the moralist, the scholar, and the philosopher. (*God on the Dock* 67)

This is the foundation for what and why Lewis writes. His understanding of myth and imagination is so poignant that to misunderstand his reasons is to misunderstand everything that he has written.

Lewis’s particular definition and use of myth does not adhere to the common nor modern conception of the fairytale or myth. Myth for Lewis is grounded in not the social or manmade structure of society but on the principle of the divine revelation upon man’s imagination. These are without a doubt conflicting ideas and are yet more proof that myth is not fairytale. If anything, according to the definitions that Lewis and Tolkien provide concerning myth, imagination, and fairy, it would appear that fairytales are part of myth, not the other way around. Myth is the larger, stronger genre steeped in meaning that goes beyond just the common social

order and structure. It goes beyond the world of wish-fulfillment, to the broader, grander structure of the world, to the world of order and reason, which natural existence by necessity must have. In the primary world myth touches the divine imagination and gives meaning to words, symbols, the very lives of its inhabitants.

Application

The strength of myth over fairytale as a form of expression is obvious when looked at more closely, when the historical, traditional, and logical definitions are applied to fairytale and myth. It is understandable why the modern critics do not like the older more traditional views of myth and its overt connections to the divine and truth. In a world where man is the ultimate truth and divinity is a falsehood made up by primitive man, it is difficult to see the value, the meaning in myth. However, this sort of thinking is the wishful thinking of the fairytale. The critics wish for the gods to be a lie, so that they can make their man-centered happily ever after. Unfortunately, such desires are not only detrimental to the critics and the modern readers, it is detrimental to the overall appreciation of literature.

Regardless of how *pagan* a myth is, there is still truth in it because that is the nature of myth. Campbell studied myth and cultures, but in all of his analysis he failed to give what he was studying any meaning because he did not give credence to or validate the various cultures belief in their myths. Mere social conventions do not justify or even explain sacrifices, rituals or the sky. When Lewis approaches myth from the Christian perspective, he is convinced that Christ is the True Myth that all other myths are an attempt to explain the Incarnation. Such conclusions about all myths may not be entirely correct but at least Lewis validates and gives credit to all of the previous myths ever told. He sees value in the story, the ritual, the sacrifices, and the sky.

For these reasons, when addressing literature it is important to keep in mind the distinction between myth and fairytale particularly if one is going to be considering any piece of literature that Lewis wrote. Myth may have been lost in modern criticism, but it was not lost to men like Lewis and Tolkien or Kirk. They understand the significance of the religious from the mundane, the magic from the divine, and the Truth from the wishing. Myth is the reality because it is compilation of the whole man—his body and his soul—as it relates to all of life and death, while fairytales deal only with the man as he is in the flesh, what he wishes to be in this life. Myth is the revelation of truth, and fairytale the explanation of social customs. Myth reveals universal truth through specifics and fairytale reveals specificity of culture through apparent commonalities.

So in the particular study of *Till We Have Faces*, the terms, fairytale and myth, will be used as they have been defined here. Lewis's retelling of the myth will be considered under not only the guise of myth but of fairytale as well. To this end the various definitions and concepts about fairytale and myth will give credence through the examination of the text.

Chapter 2: On Fairytales

“Most scholars generally agree that the *literary* development of the children’s fairy tale *Beauty and the Beast*, conceived by Madame le Prince de Beaumont in 1756 as part of *Le Magasin des Enfants*, translated into English in 1761 as *The Young Misses Magazine Containing Dialogues between a Governess and Several Young Ladies of Quality, Her Scholars*, owes its origins to the Roman writer Apuleius, who published the tale of *Cupid and Psyche* in *The Golden Ass* in the middle of the second century A.D.” (Zipes, *Fairytales as Myth* 24).

The progression of the myth to the fairytale

Just as the definitions of myth have progressed into the genre of fairytale, so have the actual stories of myth become fairytales. The sharing and overlapping of motifs is one of the reasons why critics have such problems with defining myth and fairytale. Some scholars speculate that the Beauty and the Beast story line is even older than Apuleius’s version found in the *Golden Ass*. Anderson, in *Fairytales in the Ancient World*, makes a case that Apuleius’s version of Cupid and Psyche is not the original or the oldest version. The concept of the forbidden bridegroom, which Anderson considers to be part of the main theme, is seen in the story of Zeus and Semele as recorded in the seventh book of Nonnos’ *Dionysiaca* (62). And if one is willing to accept Anderson’s interpretations of the motifs of Apuleius’s story of Cupid and Psyche—the supernatural husband, the marriage, the breaking of the taboo, the search for the husband, and the reunion—then there are many more stories in other regions that share that same motif, particularly the breaking of the taboo (63).

This realization that Apuleius’s version is not the first story does not detract from the mythic or even fairytale elements of his story, but only enhances the understanding of how or why the motif is so popular and universal. The story has meaning that transcends culture. It can

be told in many ways and in many fashions and yet remains predominately the same story. To explain his theory, Anderson uses the Hittite myth:

We should emphasize how much the Hittite text and the extended myth of Semele show us about the convergence of myth, ritual, and fairytale. A great deal of the supposed distinction rests on our own perspective. If the myth of Telepinus is being told to a Hittite prospective myth in prolonged labour, we can see the text as the narrative contents of a birthing ritual involving genuine gods and genuine belief; but we can also see it as midwives telling a mother a story to divert her from the business on hand. Male observers might well see it as an *anilis fibula*, just as Apuleius did. We might usefully bridge the gap by seeing it as ‘The Midwife’s Tale.’ (Anderson 69)

Anderson, in his attempt to understand the motif, settles on the weaker explanation of the story as simply an old wives’ tale and not a myth; however, the connection between the mythic elements as the story progresses to the fairytale is evident. The connection centers around perspective, how the tale is told, and the reason behind the telling. Just as Apuleius’s version of *Cupid and Psyche* is a retelling of an old Hittite story, so one can see the natural progression of the tale transforming into the more recognizable form of *Beauty and the Beast* (Anderson 70).

Anderson’s ideas are very similar to Zipes’ discussion, which argues that the *Beauty and the Beast* stories that became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were based off of the older story. Zipes also labels the original version in Apuleius’s story as an old wives’ tale and not nothing more. But such a claim lays the groundwork for his discussion about the mythic qualities that transform fairytales into myths. What Zipes is trying to get at is that fairytales can become myth:

Fairy tales do not become mythic unless they are in almost perfect accord with the underlying principles of how male members of society seek to arrange object relations to satisfy their wants and needs. The fairy tales must seem natural and celebrate submission by the opposite sex of the dominated so that the dominated can feel the beauty of their actions. (*Fairytales as Myth* 41)

Zipes approaches his criticism from a purely Marxist viewpoint. His definition of the mythic is that the story is universal and celebrates role reversal—that is to say the dominated must learn to submit to beauty. He believes that the story of *Beauty and the Beast*, the Psyche story, is one of those tales that has reached such heights to make it mythic in quality.

It is generally known that one of the joys of fairytales is the ability to tell them over and over again. There is something soothing about hearing the familiar story. No matter who is telling the story, the predictability and the formula of a fairytale remains the same. Fairytale traditions even in the era of books are carryovers from a time of oral traditions, of communal or familial recitations (or, later, readings) of a story. Marina Warner in *From the Beast to the Blonde*, discusses the various tellers of tales. She mentions at some length the form of the “old wives’ tale” and the social aspect of storytelling, how it is the foundation of the culture (21). The tellers of tales were women who had lived long and knew more history. Old wives’ tales are passed from generation to generation preserving parts of the culture and history as they are transmitted to generation to generation.

In later years these same old wives tales were developed and cultivated into larger stories such as the Medieval romance, as is demonstrated by the various versions the *Cupid and Psyche* story during that period:

Many fairy-lover tales feature a command or taboo that the mortal must obey in

order to preserve his or her relationship with the fairy. The greater number of taboos entail secrecy and involve the speech of the mortal (motif C400)...Other conditions imposed by otherworldly lovers include time of place taboos, such as Melusine's restriction on her husband never to visit her on Saturday. (Lindahl 130)

These retellings continue the traditions of the beauty-and-beast structure throughout the middle ages. Courtly-love and the stipulations that are placed on the lovers are motifs that are clearly seen to have come from the original story.

Fairytales are entertaining and clever; although they impart some moral knowledge, they are first and foremost forms of entertainment. The proof of this appears in the seventeenth and eighteenth century when fairytales became the vogue in the high court and courtly society (Zipes 24). Telling fairytales became a competition and a game, who could tell the better story. Fortunately, these high society ladies also saw fit to write down their tales. This is where many of the more modern concepts and versions of various fairytales came into existence. One of these stories is the Beauty and the Beast story. Zipes provides descriptions of many different incarnations of this tale and how the different versions use the motif of beauty, marriage, the beast, the taboo, and the trials before reconciliation. The argument remains that the story of Cupid and Psyche found a new audience. Changing the names and the places did not change the story.

At the turn of the twentieth century, what were once court and high society stories had become nursery room stories for children. The Victorians found the moralization of the fairytales useful in teaching good manners and etiquette to their children; thus, they confined not only their children to the nursery but the fairytales as well. Fairytales became less about folklore and

superstitions and more about scaring children into submission. To believe in the actuality or reality of the tales is fanciful and child's play (Zipes, *Fairy Tale as Myth* 14-15). This was the first step in creating a category for children's literature. The children's versions were "sanitized" and, therefore, protected children from the harsh realities of adulthood and literature.

Lewis and his cohorts were concerned with these notions of fairytale as they tried to redeem the stories from becoming completely banal and underappreciated. In his commentary "On Three Ways of Writing for Children," Lewis combated the notion that there are books for adults and books for children:

In my own first story I had described at length what I thought a rather fine high tea given by a hospitable faun to the little girl who was my heroine. A man, who has children of his own, said. 'Ah, I see how you got to that. If you want to please grown-up readers you give them sex, so you thought to yourself, "That won't do for children, what shall I give them instead? I know! The little blighters like plenty of good eating.'" In reality, however, I myself like eating and drinking. I put in what I would have liked to read when I was a child and what I still like reading now that I am in my fifties. (Lewis 31)

Unfortunately, even after Lewis's success with *Chronicles of Narnia* in not only the realm of children's books but also for adults, the argument has not changed. There is still an assumption that adults and children cannot like the same reading material. In the world of fairytales, any story that might have encouraged adults to read with the same enjoyment as children is destroyed by the feminists, who saw what the Victorians and Disney had done to fairytales and were repulsed by the weak, subservient women.

In the later part of the twentieth century, feminist revisionists took fairytales and turned

them on their heads. Fairytales, that once told morals about how little girls ought to behave, were stripped of such noble meaning to liberate the girls into complete sexual freedom. Instead of encouraging social moral behavior, the new fairytales suggest a subversion of the traditions. The realm of literature needs strong female characters, but the direction that the feminine revisionists have taken is not the solution. A classic example of a revision reveling in sexuality is Angela Carter's "In the Company of Wolves," where the heroine seduces the wolf. This tale is no longer a comfortable story told to children at bedtime. Her story is supposed to invoke sexual awareness and promote sexual independence.

This is exactly what Lewis warns about in "On Three Ways to Write for Children." In many ways, Lewis's essay is more subversive than Angela Carter's story, because Lewis is challenging adult readers and writers to be more considerate of themselves and their young readers. Lewis suggests that there does not and should not be such a divide between children's stories and adult literature. How someone writes and what someone reads should not be dictated by preconceived notions. Granted, Lewis is talking of the ideal. But in the case of the revisionist telling of fairytales, no child should read them. However, the point of his argument is to clarify the misconception that fairytales are only for children.

The revisionists and modern critics have taken away one of the vital parts of a fairytale; its universality. According to the current mode of thought, Fairytales are either of one extreme: the model for sexual freedom or frivolous escapist literature for children. There is no middle ground, no common treatment of the tales (Zipes, *Breaking* 211). As Lewis sees it, fairytales are supposed to be for all people of all ages. This is part of the glorious history of the oral tradition that fairytales came from. Folktale, fairytales, old wife's tales, and myths are all part of the oral traditions. They are all stories that were told to the community for the sake of the community.

They gave the community identity, camaraderie, and unity. The stories were not just for the children of the community, but for all people to learn and experience the same story. As Zipes points out, “the meaning of fairy tales and fantasy literature has always had social implications, and the metaphorical narratives are imaginative projections and comments that concern the immediate reality of the author and the author’s readers” (*Breaking* 211). In a culture that values individualism and personal identity, modern society has lost the communal understanding of fairytales and how they are supposed to work within the community. Disney may have commercialized many fairytales, but at least he understood the universality of the stories.

Today, the field of fairytale literature and criticism is tied up in Marxism, feminism and the need to psychoanalyze every character and situation. However, traditional fairytales must be examined within the terms of modern criticism. Even stories that sound like fairytales but may be myth or vice versa must somehow fit into that criticism. The story of Cupid and Psyche, the original written version of the Beauty and the Beast, is one such tale that has never been fully defined—is it a myth or is it a fairytale? Critics are not in agreement. With that in mind, the following sections will look at three very distinct version of the story, Apuleius’s, Robin McKinley, and, C. S. Lewis’s. Each of the stories will be addressed in the manner of a fairytale and how it is interpreted as such.

The Myth as a Fairytale: *The Golden Ass*

It is generally known and considered standard practice to locate Apuleius’s tale of Cupid and Psyche in *The Golden Ass* the first literary version of Beauty and the Beast. Interestingly, Apuleius’s version does not give the story of Cupid and Psyche in the context of any great revelatory or religious sphere. Anderson claims that “even in this case arguments continue over whether the following tale, the first recognized telling of *Cupid and Psyche*, is a real fairytale as

we understand it, or woven synthetic product which it has been convenient for the author of *The Golden Ass* to present as a fairytale” (5). He and many critics skip the debate whether the tale is a myth or not, and jump to the consensus that the story is basically an interesting tale with no greater value. However, such an argument degrades the power and influence of the story. For the sake of this argument, the story of Cupid and Psyche must at least be a fairytale.

As a fairytale, its origins are what one would expect; it is told by an old woman. The old woman tells the story as a distraction for a young girl in cruel circumstances. She brings comfort and a “pretty story of an old wife’s tale,” which is the story of Cupid and Psyche (Apuleius 74). The little old woman is, in fact, the stereotype for the hag or nurse, who would typically tell such tales to children. The idea of the old wives’ tale is rooted in the deeper notion of the tale spinner, “weaving a plot: the metaphors illuminate the relation; while the structure of fairy stories, with their repetitions, reprises, elaboration and minutiae, replicates the thread and fabric of one of the women’s principle labours – the making of textiles from the wool or the flax to the finished bolt of cloth” (Warner 23). The setup is completely in line with the classic understanding of oral traditions and how fairytales were developed. For all intents and purposes, Cupid and Psyche’s tale is nothing more than an old wives’ tale.

The story begins in the fairytale fashion. The language is typically vague. The phrase, “in a certain city” gives the feeling of familiarity, yet distance (Apuleius 75). The city could be any city. Specific names are given to the deities, but the king and his daughters and the country in which they dwell are all ambiguous. Even the name of Psyche is not meant to be a particular name. *Psyche*, in Greek, means spirit or soul. Psyche is the universal nature; she is not a specific person but an aspect of a person. She is the heart of a person. She is anyone and everyone. Her trials are everyone’s and anyone’s trials. All girls are meant to identify with Psyche and see

themselves in her.

What sets the king apart as something special is the beauty of his daughters. His three daughters are beautiful and the third is so beautiful that it has become commonplace for devout subjects to look upon her as a goddess and pay her homage. Instead of an evil stepmother, the story has a jealous goddess. Instead of wicked stepsisters, the actual sisters are driven mad by their sister's beauty. No beast exists, but only the suggestion of one. A taboo is placed on the beauty: she is to trust her unseen husband and not look upon him. The jealous goddess and the evil sisters are the undoing of the happy ending for the beauty, and she due to her own weakness disobeys her beloved. She is cast out from her beloved and must face trials and tribulations before she can receive reconciliation with the one she loves.

Apuleius's tale is artistic and told in a fashion that promotes the most pleasure to the ear. The meaning of the story is simple—trials before blessings. The story is not told for any religious purpose or means of illuminating the darkened truths. The old hag tells the story to ease the pain of loss and to fill time. The captive girl finds hope in the tale, and even the hero of Apuleius's story, who has been transformed into an ass, finds courage. But the story is initially told only for its value as a story and nothing more, at least that is what some critics claim. The value of the story, according to Anderson, is its timeless quality. In his argument, the timeless nature of a fairytale allows for the story not only to travel from century to century in a myriad of forms, but to traverse cultures as well.

Nevertheless, one can see how Apuleius's story fits into two of Bottigheimer's categories, the restoration tale and the rise tale. The beauty known as Psyche in this story falls from grace because of her disobedience. She must overcome great trials and she receives magical help to complete them. In Psyche's case, there are ants who separate the grains, a reed tells her

how to obtain a tuft of wool from the golden sheep, and the tower reveals to her how she can reach the realms of Dis and return. These tasks are the part that make this story a restoration tale. Psyche must work and overcome great trials that seem impossible so that she can prove herself worthy of her Beloved. Once she has preformed the tasks, her beloved can come and *restore* her to the position of wife and lover once again. In Psyche’s case, Cupid comes as she is completing the last task for Venus. She has let curiosity get the better of her, and instead of finding an elixir for beauty in the box from Dis, she finds “the sleep of Hades” (Apuleius 111). Cupid wakes her so that she may actually complete her task and gives her this warning: “see how as before your curiosity might have been your undoing” (112). This is the fairytale moral—a warning against curiosity. But Psyche is able to complete the task at hand and Cupid “see[s] to the rest” (112). Thus, the Beloved finally initiates the restoration of the lost Psyche.

However, this story is more than just a restoration tale; it is a rise tale as well. What makes this story a rise tale is that in the end, Psyche is not only restored to her rightful place by her husband but she is transformed and given a place among the gods, since her husband is divine. Through the magic of the god’s drink, ambrosia, Psyche gains immortality and the promise of her husband’s eternal love. From mortality to immortality, Psyche’s story is one of how a lowly girl becomes the wife of a god. Granted, the usual fairytale formula is for a commoner to marry a prince, but here the commoner is a daughter of a king and the prince is a god. The story has a loftier rise in society but the theme is still the same. Psyche is elevated beyond her original position into a greater one. Just as the trials were to prove her love and fidelity to her husband, so they prove that she is worthy of the rise in status.

Interestingly, Apuleius’s version of the story does not assert that the girl is the only one in need of education. Jupiter points out at the very end that the tempestuous youth and juvenile

behavior of Cupid must be “shackled” (113). And it is Jupiter’s opinion – therefore, the right opinion – that marriage is the way to transform a youth into a man and make him a productive member of the society at large. So even though Cupid is the making of Psyche, she too is the making of him. The morals found in this story of Cupid and Psyche are clearly the markings of fairytale literature.

Beauty and The Beast: The modern conception of Cupid and Psyche

From the original tale to the modern renditions, much has changed and much has not. The motif is the constant. The trials that Beauty faces are not those of Psyche, but Beauty must still demonstrate her loyalty and love, and the Beast must mend his behavior as well. This tale is primarily for girls and was originally told by woman to those girls: “*Beauty and the Beast* originated as a sex-specific tale intended to inculcate a sense of good manners in little girls” (Zipes, *Fairytales as Myth* 32). Marina Warner explains it slightly differently:

The ancient tale of *Cupid and Psyche* told of their love...the tales in the Beauty and Beast group – number among the most eloquent testaments to women’s struggles, against arranged marriage, and towards a definition of the place of sexuality in love. The enchantments and disenchantments of the beast have been a rich resource in stories women have made up, among themselves, to help, to teach, to warn. (318)

The versions that come after Apuleius explore the nature of men and woman and how they interact. Amazingly, no matter who tells the story or how it is told the natures of Beauty and the Beast are largely the same. There are a few revisionists like Angela Carter who would like to interpret the story to mean sexual liberation and not “to house-train the id” (Warner 310).

Nevertheless, Carter is predominately out-numbered in criticism. Disney has popularized the tale

with the 1991 version *Beauty and the Beast*. And Carter's perspective was not in their agenda. The idea of taming the wild beast exists, but the beast represents the "lost innocence of the plains before man came to plunder" (Warner 315). The beast just needs to be loved so that his human nature can come forth. The story is more about love and devotion and self-realization, than it is about sexual freedom and reveling in the bestiality of sex.

Just as there are a myriad of version of the Beauty and the Beast story found in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the tradition of writing and retelling of the story has continued. A decent modern version, which stays within the bounds of the more traditional version of the fairytale, is Robin McKinley's *Beauty*. Many of the essential points of the plot that are seen in Madame Le Prince de Beaumont's version come to life with McKinley's telling. Beauty is the youngest of three sisters. Their father is a merchant fallen on hard times. He goes to see if he can improve their fortunes. Beauty asks for a rose, while her sisters ask for jewels. Their father returns with only a rose and a tale of a great and terrible Beast that demands the life of one of his daughters in exchange for his life. Beauty, in a show of exceptional character, goes to the Beast in order to save her father's life. Beauty learns to love the Beast, and when she willingly agrees to marry him, the curse is broken. So the story goes.

As in the story that Apuleius tells, Beaumont's version reveals the jealousy and vanity of the sisters, which could be the undoing of Beauty. However, McKinley's version shows a different side to the sisters. Beauty is not the exceptionally beautiful one; she is rather plain compared to her sisters and particularly practical. Beauty's sisters are kind, sweet and very loving. If anything, their love for Beauty is nearly her undoing. McKinley's version of the story focuses on the depth of love and self-sacrifice that one comes to expect in the story of *Beauty and the Beast*, but she does not give that virtue only to Beauty.

In some respects, by giving all of the characters in the story noble personalities, there is really no adversary but the immaterial magician who cursed the Beast and perhaps each individual's own weakness of self-doubt and loss. McKinley's characters are the good hardworking sort that take pride in honest work. They are a stellar example of a loving, strong family that can and do weather the storm because they love each other and will work for each other. However, this makes Beauty's sacrifice even more powerful. She sacrifices all that is good and gentle and gives up great love to go to a vast and frightening unknown, which is the Beast's castle.

Yet, Beauty is still the fairytale character. Her Christian name in McKinley's book is Honour and as an ironic nickname, she is called Beauty, even though she is particularly plain. But her names are important to her character: "Beauty is selfless, and perhaps that is why she has no name, she is nameless. All girls are supposed to become 'beauties,' i.e. selfless and nameless" (Zipes, *Fairytale as Myth* 33). Beauty is honourable. She is good; she is honest; she is self-sacrificial; she is dutiful to a fault. Beauty must be these things in order to fulfill her part in the fairytale. She demonstrates that through doing as she is told, and sacrificing in the process her own desire, she will obtain her desire through her obedience:

The justification of Beauty's right to marry is part of a series of discourse on manners that constitute the major theme of the tale: virtuous behavior is true beauty, and only true beauty will be rewarded, no matter what class you are. Beauty (and other characters as well) are tested throughout the tale to determine whether they can tame their unruly feelings (desire, greed, envy, and so forth) and become civilized...Beauty always chooses to fulfill her obligations rather than follow her heart. Although it does turn out that, by fulfilling her obligations, her

heart is rewarded, it is plain to see that her destiny depends on self-denial that, she comes to believe, is a wish-fulfillment. (Zipes, *Fairytales as Myth* 30)

Bettelheim suggests that *Beauty and the Beast* is not only about the transformation of a beast into a man, but also about healing. A girl learns to transfer her love properly from father to husband (303). This is a story about learning how to love properly and in its proper time. Beauty goes from being an unwilling bride to a willing one.

The story also has implications concerning appearance and the shallowness of only being able to look at things skin deep. Beauty is by definition beautiful; however, even if she were plain as in McKinley's version, what gives Beauty her beauty is actually her character. Beauty would not be able to love the Beast if he did not show the virtue of a good heart – kindness, gentleness, self-sacrifice. The Beast is ugly because of an enchantment. He may have had a dark soul (Warner 299), which was why he was enchanted to begin with, but by the time Beauty arrives in the story, the Beast has for the most part reformed. He waits for someone to love the beastly appearance so that the man beneath can return.

Like Apuleius's tale, these other manifestations of the story continue to provide the motif of the restoration tale and the rise tale. The Beast is restored to his former self through the trials and sacrifices of Beauty, and Beauty is elevated through her great love and devotion from a merchant's daughter to a queen. Oddly enough, in the later incarnations of the story the trials of Beauty are her separation from her family and not so much the separation from her lover. The Beast's trials are not so much the mistrustful actions of his beloved but his own failings – pride, arrogance, violence, or infidelity. The Beast is quick to let his anger overrule his reason as is witnessed by his first appearance, when he roars at Father for taking one rose. It is the one thing the Beast values most, and therefore he demands that Father give up what he values most—his

life or the life of one of his daughters (McKinley 90). Beauty sees the young man the Beast once was in a painting. She remarks that “there was something rather terrible about this young man’s beauty, though I could not say just where the dreadfulness lay. The hand on the bridle was clinched a little too tightly; the light in the eyes was a little too bright, as if the soul itself were burning” (187). He must master his temper and the arrogance that was the cause of his curse. The trials become internal struggles that demand great virtue to overcome. These virtues – strength, honour, grace, love, prudence – are the lesson that the hearer of the tale should take with them when the tale is done. The Beast must endure the nightly refusal of Beauty to marry him. It is a trial of his patience but it demonstrates the soothing of his temperament and his humility (153). The story is proof of the triumph of virtue over adversity.

Wish-fulfillment is the capstone of the fairytale. It is the driving force that takes the hero or heroine from one situation to another. Beauty wishes for a rose; the Beast wishes to be human again, to be loved. These are the wishes and desires that propel the story. Without these wishes, there is no story. However, not all critics see the wish-fulfillment as the ultimate driving force to the stories. Zipes pushes his Marxist view and takes the “wishing” to mean class struggle:

The world of the folk tale is inhabited largely by kings, queens, princes, princess, soldiers, artisans, peasants, animals and supernatural creatures, rarely by members of the middle class. Nor are there machines and signs of industrialization. In other words, the main characters and concerns of a monarchical and feudal society are presented, and the forces is on class struggle and competition for power among the aristocrats themselves, and between the peasantry and aristocracy, and among the peasants, Hence the central theme of all folk tales: “might makes right.”

(*Breaking* 35)

“Might makes right” as long as the fairy is on your side. Generally, the fairy is on the good side. Which is to say, the might in most fairy stories is moral and just. Beauty’s desire once at the castle of the Beast is to be free, but her wish is not granted in the manner that she would have expected. She actually has the power—the power to leave and therefore kill the Beast. This is her might over him, but her desire is not fully realized because it is not the right thing for her or for the Beast.

Zipes’s analysis about the classes is not false, but it is not entirely the whole picture, because he misses the point of wishing. No one wishes to achieve the height of middle class. Middle class by its definition is only an in-between state. Yes, the struggle of the classes does exist, but it is more about the desire for what one does not have and could not naturally have. The moment of great fulfillment is when Beauty realizes that she does love the Beast and she does not want to leave him. She is given an elevated position, but the position means nothing without the wishing.

Zipes does acknowledge the cynical end of wish-fulfillment in reality. He sees the Disneylands and the cheap commercialization of the fairytale concept as an insult and a pollution of the true nature of fairytales, and such conclusions are not too far from the truth (*Breaking* 118). Fairytales can reveal things about reality, but they cannot be reality. Modern society has lost the distinction between what the story tells about human nature and how that is supposed to affect humanity. The desire to suspend reality in the form of the fairytale is like the desire of the wicked stepmother in Snow White who wanted to stay beautiful forever. The stories tell the tale of proper wish-fulfillment, not gluttonous wishing for more wishes. Beauty must learn the art of self-sacrifice and then her duty becomes her desire. Her love for the Beast is in its proper place. However, Zipes’s conclusion once again is grounded in his concept of social-economics and he

misses the lesson of temperance that the fairytales give concerning the wish-fulfillment process.

Also, in the case of Beauty when she goes to the Beast, his castle and the magical servants provide for her every wish and desire. Beauty only needs to speak her wish and she receives it. There are a few caveats: she cannot make it stop raining and she should not wish for an object to do something that is contrary to its nature or purpose, but generally speaking her wish is the castle's command (McKinley 191). But such a life, though appealing at first, is rather tedious. Bettelheim suggests that such a life "far from being satisfying, soon becomes empty and boring – so much so that Beauty comes to look forward to the evening visits of the Beast" (307). Unlimited wish-fulfillment is not altogether pleasant because it takes away from the trial and growth. For Beauty, the wish-fulfillment actually becomes part of her trial to the point that she is willing to cling to the Beast to free herself from it. In Beauty's case, the fulfillments drive her to her true, not yet fully realized, desire.

However, all this talk of wishes and fulfilling of dreams has no merit in the real world. In the end, the wishing for a prince is not going to happen in the real world. What does happen is that a girl learns what is expected of her. She grows up and gets married, but not necessarily to the prince. Wishing does not make a thing happen, not in the real world. Wishing gives hope, and the desire to improve oneself, but it does not change who or what someone is. Fairytales tell of the ideal and the true nature of good character. The wishing for a rose was innocent; the wishing in the castle was extravagant. But what made Beauty happy in the end was the simplicity of love.

Till We Have Faces: A Fairytale

Lewis writes his version of Cupid and Psyche in a time of transition, after Disney, before the Feminists. He calls his story "a myth retold." However, there are elements to his version that

blatantly reveal the nature of a fairytale. It would be difficult for him to write a story about Cupid and Psyche or Beauty and the Beast without it sounding like a fairytale. The tale's themes are too connected to the fairytale structure. However, Lewis does not let this distract him or his readers. He interlaces his story intentionally with elements to give the story a fairytale quality.

The story is told from Orual's perspective. She is the narrator. It is a reflective tone, but she is telling it as an old woman. It is her story, but it is also the story of an "old wife" – even though Orual was never married, she embodies that symbol. She presents the setting for her story in Glome, a fictional place that could be any place. It is specific enough to provide believability and vague enough to be any place. Orual is to some extent the heroine but she considers herself the victim. In the other versions of the fairytale, Orual would be the one who causes the downfall of Psyche. This style of telling the story does not make it any less of a fairytale but does add an interesting internal perspective on the events that are familiar to the reader.

In modern society where revisionists take pleasure in telling the story from the viewpoint of a supposed victim of injustice – the ugly step-sister, the wicked witch, the big bad wolf – it is interesting to note that very few critics have mentioned the genius of Lewis's storytelling. Maria von Franz gives a very brief and rather feeble analysis of *Till We have Faces*. The only praise she gives is to say that Lewis "created very aptly a kind of modern paraphrase of this story of the jealous sister" (Franz, *The Golden* 93). Lewis does tell the step-sister's story, but Franz fails to understand or at least chooses to overlook the complexity of his intent. She claims that Lewis's characterization of Orual and even Redival are merely "the shadow figure of Psyche" (93). Franz does not appreciate the motif that Lewis is using to tell his story. The step-sister thinks she is the victim and the reader believes this right along with her. However, Lewis does not make the same clichéd ending of the modern writers. In the end Lewis, tells not only Orual's story but Psyche's

and Redival's and Ansit's. The victim is exposed to her faults and the truth is revealed. In fact Lewis's version of the story is not like the modern revisionists at all.

Orual is not the only "old wife" in the story. Batta, the nurse for Orual and Redival, is also given the characteristics of the old hag, the nursemaid who is always gossiping. She is the one who knows what everyone is up to in the palace. Orual constantly reveals her dislike for the "sullen and too fond of the wine-jar" woman (Lewis, *TWHF* 21). Batta introduces many of the fairytale constructs into the story. She is the one who tells the sisters about the stepmother: "Only wait till your father brings home a new queen to be your stepmother. It'll be changed times for you then. You'll have hard cheese instead of honey-cakes then and skim milk instead of red wine" (5). The stepmother, though not a concept necessarily of the Beauty and the Beast story, is a fairytale element. She is in many ways a stock-character in fairytale stories.

The fairytale elements in *Till We Have Faces* are not quite as they seem. The stepmother who Orual fears is not the evil, vindictive creature that Batta would have the girls believe. First of all, Batta is not the one who announces to the girls that they are to have a new mother; it is the king himself (9). Had it been Batta, the realization of this change would not have been as real for Orual as it was coming from her distant and hard father. Because of the introduction of the stepmother, Orual learns that she is ugly. Whereas in the typical fairytale, the young girl is seen as a threat to the stepmother (as is seen in Snow White, Cinderella, and many more), in Orual's case she is seen only as an object, because of her ugliness, that might frighten the new queen (11). And in another deviation from the stereotypical concepts about stepmothers in fairytales, Orual claims that in the short time that she had to get to know her new mother, she found her to be more like a sister (14).

The birth of Psyche is reminiscent of Snow White, where the queen dies giving birth to

the most beautiful baby girl (Lewis, *TWHF* 14). Psyche is everything that a fairytale beauty should be. Even the stoic character of the Fox cannot deny the divine or magical beauty of Psyche (21). Orual, reminiscing about her time with Psyche, is overcome with the unbelievable magic of it. Even though she knows that it is not possible “it seems to have been all spring and summer” while Psyche was growing up (22). This is more than just memory’s trick on the mind. But the idealism and magic of childhood was destroyed by the plague that swept the land and the inevitable sacrifice of Psyche to the Beast, the Shadowbrute of the Gray Mountains. So the story must go, since this is Beauty and the Beast.

Lewis also employs the use of wish-fulfillment in his story. As in fairytales, one character wishes correctly and one does not. In Orual’s case, she does not know how to wish properly. She writes, “I wanted to be a wife so that I could have been her real mother. I wanted to be a boy so that she could be in love with me. I wanted her to be my full sister instead of my half sister. I wanted her to be a slave so that I could set her free and make her rich” (Lewis, *TWHF* 23). Orual wants to be all things for Psyche and in the process forgets how to be the one thing that Psyche needed. Orual might have been a true sister to Psyche, but all her wishing to be things that she was not caused the downfall of Psyche and herself. Orual claims that it was love that drove her to “save” Psyche from the house and marriage to the Shadowbrute, even after she saw that Psyche was well and cared for (115). Her wishing was not fulfilled because it was misplaced. Had Orual simply stopped and looked, as she had in the moment of clarity in the mist, to see and believe what Psyche had told her was true, then she might have realized her true wish, which was the happiness of Psyche (132-133). But Orual deceives herself for her own selfish wishing.

Orual is not the only character who experiences wish-fulfillment. Psyche too, has her wishes. Psyche on the night before she is to be sacrificed confesses to a very distraught Orual:

The sweetest thing in all my life has been the longing – to reach the Mountain, to find the place where all the beauty came from...my county, the place where I ought to have been born. Do you think it all meant nothing, all the longing? The longing for home? For indeed it now feels not like going, but like going back. All my life the god of the Mountain has been wooing me. Oh, look up once at least before the end and wish me joy. I am going to my lover. (Lewis, *TWHF* 75)

Psyche's wish is the good and proper wish. She desires the husband and the knowledge of what the Mountain can give her. When Orual comes to visit, she is content and happy. But for her love for Orual, Psyche has no want. She is content with the taboo that her lover has placed on her, not to look at him, because she is for the time being enjoying the fulfillment of her wish.

In this version, Psyche's castle does provide her with all her wishes as the castle in *Beauty*, but as long as she obeys the wish of her lover, the wish-fulfilling castle does not become a burden. But as soon as Psyche disobeys, her desires can no longer be fulfilled. Psyche's lover, who is the God of the Mountain, gives Psyche the only punishment that could truly hurt her: he cast her from his presence. Her wish is still to be with him, but she cannot fulfill it any longer. This is where the exile and trials of Psyche are her path to restoration. Her desire is no longer just to be with her lover, but to forsake all other loves, including the love of Orual for the love of her husband. Because of her misplaced desire, Orual loses all, including the one thing she does wish for: the love of Psyche.

There is not magic *per se* in Lewis's version of the story, but there is the supernatural. The magic is in the elements of the unknown and the holiness of Ungit and the mystery of their god-worship. But Orual does not believe entirely in the magic of the supernatural; she is proving that even if the gods do exist, they are not working for the better interest of man. She ends Part I

of her story with the rather angry statement that the gods gave no reply to her (Lewis, *TWHF* 250). The second part is the process of self-discovery and could be misconstrued as a restoration theme, but restoration implies that the character was once at that same point, and Orual was never aware of anyone else's condition but her own throughout the first part. One could describe it in the context of a rise tale, but Orual is not given the traditional ending of a rise tale. She is not elevated through marriage, but through her death. The reader catches glimpses of Psyche and her restoration to her husband, but the story is not about Psyche (246). The first part with its rather dark and not so hopeful conclusion fits under the fairytale category that Bottigheimer calls the folktale. The use of magic is practical and the ending realistic. There is not necessarily meant to be a happy ending because life does not have a happy ending. Orual's story is one of hardship and the denial of wish-fulfillment.

However, though Lewis used elements of fairytale in his story, fairytale criticism does not give a complete understanding for the story. There are too many elements in the second part that do not fit into the category of fairytale criticism, even the more traditional views of structure, motif or symbolism. Lewis follows the patterns of the fairytale only as long as it fits his purpose. He says that he is retelling a myth and not a fairytale. A fairytale analysis of his text is ultimately frustrating because fairytale criticism cannot work on a myth because myths are not subcategories of the fairytale. The fairytale cannot answer the questions that are raised in the second part of the story. Orual's initial denial of the power of the gods does not negate their existence or intervention. Bottigheimer's definitions cannot explain the divine nature of the God of the Mountain nor the mystical reunion of Psyche and Orual.

Chapter 3: Myth—the Imaginative Expression of the Real

Myth has been defined as utterance and truth. However, as Gould pointed out since it is connected to language, myth has reflected the changes of language. Gould's argument is that the "potentiality of myth must lie in the potentiality of language" (30). Several years after Lewis and Tolkien wrote their critiques and treatises on myth and language and literature, criticism took a very sharp turn in how it defined myth, language and meaning. Just as fairytale has had changing definitions that encompass a wide range of literary forms, so too has myth struggled to have a consistent understanding among critics. Throughout the years scholars have tried to pinpoint what made a myth a myth. They considered the aspects of the gods and demigods and their interactions with man. E. W. Count explains that this is the only thing that critics can agree on "myths are a form of literature... about gods and demigods" (Kirk 10).

Myth: Where the Critics Have Taken It

One of the problems with myth, in so much that it is the problem with defining it, is that myth is not simply a literary form. Myth branches into other disciplines such as philosophy, theology, anthropology, psychology and literature. Myth has been described as the human experience, or man's desperate attempt to understand the unknowable. With this in mind, trying to pinpoint a definition or concept of myth is as varied as the fields that study it. However, by gleaning through vast discussions on myth, one can start to piece together a concrete notion of what myth is and is not.

Myth is where magic, that which is unexplainable, meets up with literature, the means by which we explain the unexplainable (Vickery 73). In its simplest form myth is a story but as Purtil explains it, myth is so much more:

Myths in the original, unstretched sense were stories of gods or heroes that usually had a religious or moral purpose. As with any kind of communication, it is useful to look at the intention of the communicator, the context of understanding of the audience, and the form of the communication ... They [creators of myth] aimed to do something that they would probably have expressed as a desire to *honor* the gods and heroes and to *inspire* their listeners. Their audience, in turn, looked on the myths as conveying moral and religious lessons; in fact, the telling of and listening to myths could have moral and religious significance. Myths also had a close connection with ritual; they were acted out in ceremonies of various kinds. (Purtill 2)

Thus, myth is the story of man and his ability to understand himself in the context of his world. But his understanding is not the same as what philosophers and scientist claim to understand about the world. The knowledge that myths impart, according to Vickery and Purtill, is a knowledge of endurance. There is a matter of unscientific and un-orderly knowledge that myths describe, but what science would say is inconsistent, the story would say is immaterial (Vickery 76). Vickery explains the theory using the tale of Dionysus Zagreus:

What is recalled here is neither a physical nor historical phenomenon. It is not a fact of nature nor a recollection of the deeds or sufferings of a heroic ancestor. Nevertheless the legend is not a mere fairy tale. It had a *fundamentum in re*; it refers to a certain 'reality' ... It is *ritual*. What is seen in the Dionysian cult is explained in the myth. (Vickery 111)

The knowledge of how to live is revealed in the telling of the story, not in the facts of science. But that has not stopped the scientists from trying.

The Anthropological Approach

The story that myth tells is more than fairytale and more than lore. It is most commonly assumed to be an explanation of ritual and the meaning behind the religious ceremonies of the day. However, these views do not take into the consideration of other critics who still struggle with the idea that what some call myths could be merely folklore. Folklore has been noted to be different from fairytales, that is a fairytale may have its origins in a folklore, but a folklore will not have origins in a fairytale. This means that the folklore is at least older in nature than a fairytale. Nevertheless, the debate as to where folklore fits into the picture with myth is still very much unclear. This debate has found many supporters and proponents in the discipline of anthropology. Anthropology uses myths to help them piece together the culture that they are studying.

Anthropology has added a better understanding of how myth and religion worked together in ancient times (Kirk 3). Joseph Campbell is one of such proponent of myth in the field of anthropology. His studies have advanced modern conceptions about culture and its use of myth and story to relate to the human existence. Campbell explains, “[t]he material of myth is the material of our life, the material of our body, and the material of our environment, and a living vital mythology deals with these in terms that are appropriate to the nature of knowledge of the time” (*Transformations* 1). Myth is so closely linked to the human experience that Campbell insists that every myth has its place in time and to the human development. He understands everyone is born like a blank slate “a little biological creature living spontaneously out of its nature. But immediately after it is born, the society begins putting its imprinting upon it” (Campbell, *Transformations* 2). For after all, as Eric Gould in *Mythical Intentions in Modern*

Literature collaborates, myth is the “historical consciousness” (Gould 63). It reveals how a culture thinks of itself and what its people value. Myth is the narrative voice of humanity.

For all of Kirk’s favorable comments concerning the anthropologists, he is concerned that many in this field limit themselves and their understanding of myths in the context of their discipline. If “the prime function of myths as the recording and validating of institutions, and in totally rejecting their speculative aspects, [than] he [Bronislaw Malinowski] has succeeded in restricting the vision of far too many anthropologists of the Anglo-American tradition” (Kirk 7). Kirk believes that myths do not exist to validate culture or vice versa. Unfortunately, Campbell because of his evolutionary theories is predisposed to look at myths in this way. Campbell views the myth and the cultures associated with them as somehow primitive and underdeveloped. So for all the great advances the anthropologists have made in the study of myth from a literary and religious perspective, these critics have missed the point. The cultures that created the myths gave them meaning and the myths gave the cultures meaning. The ideas that the myths expressed had great significance to the cultures that made them and it was not as Campbell suggests primitive babbling.

Myth and the Folktale

Myth has many elements that are similar to the folklore and critics who study both have conflicting views on how the two should be interpreted. As was discussed under the topic of fairytales, some folklorist prefer to consider folklore more in association with fairytale and less with myth, while others would consider folklore to be a type of literary twin to the myth. The connection between myth and folklore is explained most aptly by Andrew Lang:

The science of Folklore, if we may call it a science finds everywhere, close to the surface of civilized life, the remains of ideas as old as the stone elf-shots, older

than the celt of bronze. In proverbs and riddles, and nursery tales and superstitions, we detect the relics of a stage of thought, which is dying out in Europe, but which still exist in many parts of the world. (Lang 12)

He strongly believes that “mythology cannot fruitfully be studied apart from folklore” (Lang 12). Folklore and myth are part of the development of the culture and the language. Lang takes the thoughts and theories of the anthropologist and applies that science to not only better understand the cultures that produced the myths and folklore but to better understand the language and the lore. Instead of looking solely at languages within the same family group, Lang looks at myths that are similar cross culture and language. It is his hypothesis that myths provide an avenue to explain certain phenomena and that developed of mankind’s views the world in the same way (Lang 25).

Lang’s hypothesis concerning folklore and myth are similar to Jack Zipes; however, where Zipes concludes that folklore are the oldest forms that create fairytales, Lang finds the myths that the folklores came from. Lang asserts that the names and concepts of a myth are “‘stubborn things,’ and that, as the whole narrative has probably arisen from forgetfulness of the meaning of language, the secret of a myth must be sought in analysis of the proper names of the persons” (Lang 67). In other words, the names of the characters or rather the meaning in the names and the structure of the story is the driving force to what keeps a story going through generation and culture.

To prove his theories, Lang looks at stories or myths from all over the world that have similar structures. The myth is the story of Cupid and Psyche or any similar tale in which “the mythic prohibition is always broken: the hidden face is beheld; light is brought into the darkness; the forbidden name is uttered; the bride is touched with the tabooed metal, iron, and the union is

ended.” (Lang 64). Lang explains, from looking at all of these different tales, there is a theme of revelation—that is to say that by performing the taboo, light is brought into the mystery of the other sex or of the marriage customs of the people group that the story comes from (76). The fact that so many cultures and languages have a similar myth suggests a universal desire or meaning in the story that transcends merely language.

Lang’s theories coincide with other theories about myth and its relationship to folklore. Kirk in, *Myth its Meaning and Function*, discuss all of the major theories and philosophies concerning myth. Part of his argument is intended to refute those who think myth is just an extension to the folklore. Kirk uses the several classical traditions to prove his point:

Any traditional tale is likely to present some kind of mixture of actuality and fantasy; even a ‘sacred’ myth in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, about the birth and development of a god, will contain some elements drawn from life; but it is still legitimate and useful to distinguish between elements and tales that are primarily actual and those that are primarily fantastic. (Kirk 33)

Kirk argues that myth at least the myth that is seen in the Homeric tradition is myth not because of Homer but because of Aeschylus; “it has become myth by a secondary process of development, acquiring in the course of tradition those over tones of fantasy that many other myths possess from the beginning, by virtue of their subject themselves or of the essential involvement of supernatural powers” (34). Thus, legend and myth are not always two separate things nor are they easily separated.

Kirk is aware that there are a great many critics who disagree with him. Ruth Benedict writes that myth and folktales can only be “distinguished” because myths are tales about the supernatural. This is a common assumption (Kirk 35). Kirk brings up E. W. Count’s argument

that the separation of myth from the folklore that the nineteenth century was so keen on is “a piece of intellectual snobbery that according to Count has greatly complicated the assessment of myth today” (Kirk 37). However, Kirk believes that even if this is true that a distinction between the two should exist.

Kirk defines folklore as “traditional tales, of no firmly established form, in which supernatural elements are subsidiary; they are not primarily concerned with ‘serious’ subjects or the reflection of deep problems and preoccupations; and their first appeal lies in their narrative interest” (37). Kirk makes it clear that he is not assuming that folktales are “somehow upgraded into myths by the discovery of some serious or fantastic quality” (40). Though myths tend to contain elements of folklore motifs—“minimal episodic elements like the solving of a riddle, or the wearing of something that ensures invisibility, or even narrative devices like the performance of a similar action several times over in an ascending climax”—, the motifs are part of a progression of events (40). Myths contain elements of the folklore but folklore do not contain the elements of a myth:

Myths often have some serious underlying purpose beyond that of telling a story. Folktales, on the other hand, tend to reflect simple social situations; they play on ordinary fears and desires as well as on men’s appreciation of neat and ingenious solutions; and they introduce fantastic subjects more to side the range of adventure and acumen than through any imaginative or introspective urge. (Kirk 41)

The folklore, like the fairytale, deals primarily with the mundane—with only the heroes on a natural and human level. Folklore has a nameless and common feel to it. The story could take place anywhere at any time. Whereas, a myth has supernatural characters that deal with the

divine and the locations and the people are very specific (Vickery 25). Like Kirk, Vickery argues that “[a] myth is part of a creed; it is believed by the narrator. The folktale is purely fiction, and not intended to be anything else. According to the method of interpretation which is not (luckily) extinct, a myth always deals with natural phenomena, while according to another view which had advocates among the anthropologists of the previous generation and also has many influential representatives today, a myth is always connected with a ritual” (Vickery 25).

Myth as symbol

Just as the fairytales have been affected by the theories of psychoanalysis, so have myth. Myths as symbols of explaining the human condition have generally been lumped in with fairytales. However, there are some critics who at least acknowledge that myths show something deeper than fairytales. Freud and Jung are some of the most prominent theorist concerning psychoanalysis. Their theories have served to advance the study of human behavior and literary conventions through the study of symbolism. Freud thought that myths were “the expression of repressed instinctual drives in the unconscious. He treated these narratives as sources of dream material which derive from the infantile psychological life of man” (Gould 16). Freud is concerned with the hidden desires of man and they unconscious behavior. Myths are symbols and allusions to discovering those elements in man.

Though Jung’s studies are similar to Freud’s, his methods and conclusions are strikingly different. Jung uses the symbols of what he calls archetypes to understand the human existence. Myths, according to Jung, are full of “primordial images: the shadow, the anima and animus, the wise old man, and so on” (Gould 16). In other words, for Jung, “the meaning of ‘fantasy activity’ lies primarily in recovering a religious significance to an event. The world is not merely surface and symbol, but numinously so” (16). Thus, many critics of myth have adopted Jungian concepts

into their study and view myth. Even C. S. Lewis concluded that there was Jungian symbolism in *Till We Have Faces*. This does not mean that the Jungian way of looking at myth is the only method, but it does have some valid points, particularly when it comes to the use of the archetype. What may appear to be stock characters are in fact foundational elements to the human condition and understanding of the world (Gould 18).

One of the many problems of archetypal interpretations is the arbitrary nature of the primordial image-symbol (Gould 21). Jung relies on the *a priori* existence of the primordial image and he seeks meaning not in the image but in the transcendence of the image (23). Gould fears that if this is the case, then the archetypes are only a representation of what human's think of the world in which they live in, it is only an "interpretation of the world" (33). According to Gould, the Jungian theory concludes that "[m]yth, as the narrative of archetypal significance, is not an objective fact, nor a mere focus on an informing primordial image, nor a matter of received knowledge, but a working proposition, an unfolding of understanding which persuades us of its logic" (Gould 44). Myths are not as accurate as the Jungian theorist would have people believe.

However, other critics like Northrop Frye take the concept of the myth as the narrative with the archetype and concluded that the significance of the myth is the actual archetype (Vickery 93). This is not to say that Frye "confuse[s] myths and fictions, even though he writes of the latter as determined by primordial symbols. If anything, there is a lingering interest in showing that the importance of literature in our time is a revelation of myth" (Gould 27). The myth such as *The Golden Bough*, for Frye, is a metaphorical use of language that reveals to use the primary function of literature (27). The central theme or myth of literature is the quest (Vickery 95). The way the story unfolds is the primary archetype for all literature not just human

behavior. According to Frye, the metaphor is in the structure of the words and how the story is told. Thus, Frye would have to conclude that there is a very keen difference between a fairytale and a myth solely based on the language of the tale.

Myth, archetype, and metaphor as symbols are the central themes of the psychoanalytical approaches. But as symbols the myth, archetype, and metaphor must reveal something otherwise they are meaningless. Gould explains that “the metaphor is not the enigma but the solution of the enigma” (49). So myth and likewise the archetype are not the mystery but revelations of the mystery. They are all dependent upon “the process of interpretation ... which is in turn dependent on language” (66). The significance is not in what the symbol is, but in what it means to the author and reader.

Myth the Ritual and Meaning

What makes myth so important to this process of understanding is the connection between the symbolism found in the language of the story and symbolism found in the religious aspects of the rituals, which normally coincide with the myth (Kirk 24). Myth as a means of understanding ritual and religion has long been accepted by scholars as myth’s true purpose. Myths reveal or tell the meaning behind the ritual or religious practice. As Vickery describes it, myths become “[a] mode of symbolic expression objectifying early human feelings and experience, the myth is least of all the product of the reflective of historical consciousness, of the search for scientific or philosophical truth” (111).

Kirk explores the different scholars who use this interpretation of myth, which Kirk believes to be the most accurate explanation. According to Kirk, W. K. C. Guthrie regarded myth “as an aspect of religion” (Kirk 10). Myth is a fundamental part of understanding earliest forms of religious expressions. Angelo Brelich argues that “mythology has gradually revealed that it

cannot be reduced to factors outside religion, and today it is generally considered on the same plane as the other fundamental forms of religion” (Kirk 11). Without the religious connection myths are nothing more than stories, but with ritual the stories become windows into the truth.

According to these critics, myths disclose more than just the ritual of the early religions, they proved insight into the value systems and morals of the culture. Vickery insists that if myth is the literary expression of the ritual, then myth must be “taken as a representation in functional form of truths or values that are sanctioned by general belief: myth ‘tells the truth to the extent that people believe that it tells the truth’” (121). However, there are some stories particularly those from antiquity that are commonly placed under the category of myth even though they would appear to have not religious or ritual significance:

In the early stages of definition, tales like that of Paris abducting Helen, or Achilles killing Hector; or of the woman who puts off her suitors by a trick, or the other woman (or her father) who chooses her husband by a contest. The first two of these instances might be called ‘legend’, and the second two ‘folktale’, but the truth is that they all come within the range of what most people mean by ‘myth’, and yet seem to have no serious religious component whatever. (Kirk 11)

Yet, there is much more to those stories than meets the eye after a first read. The *Iliad* is more than just a war story about how Achilleus killed Hector. The interaction between the gods and men is not simply comical but demonstrate the mortal nature of man. Achilleus’s education is a process by which he learns the importance of man’s life and his proper place in the divine plan of Zeus. When one looks at the story that way, the religious significance is obvious. It is man’s destiny to die and it is man’s duty to give his fallen comrade the right of burial. It is not only the civil thing to do; it is the religious thing to do. The religious connotations of a story elevate its

meaning turning something like a war story and turning it into a myth. Kirk is sure to criticize any of the scholars who would try to take away any intelligibility from myth, such as Malinowski, who “in his anxiety to combat the excessive view of myth as a kind of primitive science, he added that they have no underlying meaning at all” (Kirk 21). Myths have to have meaning or there is no point to their existence. The fact that the myths and the archetypes of the myths have persisted through time indicates the inherent value of the myths and their meaning.

Hatab agrees with G. S. Kirk’s assertions concerning the ritual and meaning of myths: “[a] myth is a tale in that it is a dramatic narrative; it is traditional in the sense that it takes hold in a society and is found important enough to be passed on because of a communal, functional, and authoritative quality which distinguishes it from a mere ‘entertaining story’” (17). Myths tell stories that reflect a way of life that is meant to be followed and not necessarily analyzed. They disclose the real way of living to mankind by disclosing “a sacred world” that would otherwise be denied to mankind were it not for the myths (Hatab 19). Myths are stories about how man is to act and live in the knowledge of the sacredness of life:

Myth is therefore not explanation but *presentation* of the arrival/withdrawal of existential meaning. The shift from mythical disclosure to rational and scientific thinking cannot be seen as a correction of myth because it was a shift to a *new* intention—the reduction of beings to the explanatory capacities of the human mind or verifiable natural causes. To see a myth as an error (a wrong explanation) is an anachronistic misunderstanding of the function of myth. Myth presents more than natural things alone (the profane); it presents the arrival/withdrawal of sacred meaning within the world. (Hatab 23)

What Achilles learns through his story is man's sacred duty to the dead. He learns what it means to be a man. So too, the readers of the myth understand and learn what it means to be a man and what is his sacred duty towards his fellow man. This knowledge is not just about the everyday life; this is knowledge about the afterlife—the divine and the soul of man.

Since myths tell of more than just the existential human existence, what they divulge is an aspect of the real that is not readily seen. The myth tells the story and the ritual allows for the participant to experience the truth of the reality that they could not understand without the myth. The ritual and the myth are the mystery of the divine. They are tools and symbols that have meaning to the participants. There is no apparent ritual associated with the *Iliad*; however, there is ritual. The rite of burning is key to the story, which tells of the importance of burning and the rites of the dead. It is not told explicitly but the ritual is there. For as Gould states, “[m]yth does not ‘act the things’ but ‘acts their names’” (119). The ritual takes the names and acts out the things that give the names meaning in the first place.

So even though the myths may not have apparent religious significance, they are still myths by nature of their structure and meaning. They have a timeless quality to them. Gould also asserts, in *Mythical Intentions of Modern Literature*, that “it is myth and, timeless literature which reveals the only human discourse embodying every stage of these effects at interpretation: from the anxiety of fragmentation, to the subversion by language, to the encounter with the unknowability of history itself” (83). The myth has an element of timelessness. This is why the *Iliad* is still a widely read book. Time has not changed the validity or the beauty of the truth that is inherent in the text. In other words, a “myth cannot be understood from the standpoint of modern categories of objectivity or subjectivity, because myth is prior to both terms, a priority both historical and phenomenological” (Hatab 25). Critics cannot simply confine myth to a

summary of historical events like some of the anthropologists because it denies the transcendent universality of the meaning of myth (Gould 40).

Another aspect of the religious transcendence of myth is what the story and ritual unveil. The human existence according to myths does not begin and end with human life. The human experience is more than battles, homecomings, justice, and weddings. There is the human soul and the revelation of that tells of a different sort of reality than what the anthropologist, and psychoanalytic can actually grasp. This aspect of myth falls into the realm of philosophers and theologians. These disciplines are more accepting of the knowledge of the reality of the divine and the truth. Gould explains this type of reality:

The real seems to coincide with the impossible, the completely desexualized, the obstacle to the pleasure principle. It is only at the moment when the unreal has articulated itself in some elusively metaphorical way that we can call the real into being: it is the resistance of reality to the imaginary or to the symbolic, the approachable but never quite graspable. Is not the domain of the real, then, fall not only peculiarly stubborn analytic problems, but a whole range of ontological questioning and social compromises that we locate in the area of art, myth, and philosophy. (Gould 83)

Therefore, myth is the imaginative expression of reality. Myths through metaphors and symbols reveal the truth about the reality of human existence, which is not apparent to the mere observer.

Having considered the critics and scholars, it is clear that myth tells more than just a story. Myths are not merely folklore or fairytales. They carry the weight of meaning and revelation. Myth has religious and cultural significance and gives meaning to the reality of man. Myth is the expression of the real. It uses imagery, imagination and symbolism to explain that

which human existence cannot justify with mere observation. The stories that myths tell are universal they have the power and ability to be told and retold. However, some telling do not always preserve the true nature of the myth as is seen in fairytale version of *Cupid and Psyche*.

The Myth that Apuleius Told

Apuleius's version of *Cupid and Psyche* has already undergone the scrutiny of a fairytale; however, the story was looked at in isolation from the whole novel. The debate over whether or not *Cupid and Psyche* story is merely filler is still ongoing, but it cannot be ignored. If the story is merely filler, than it is most likely nothing more than an old wife's tale. However, it is ridiculous to think that so much time and articulation would be paid to a meaningless story. The tale of *Cupid and Psyche* must have significance to the larger story and it does. Doris Myers claims that *Cupid and Psyche* is a digression which is a "technical term in ancient and medieval rhetoric referring specifically to a story that occurs within a larger story and mirrors it" (147). Thus, the tale is not merely an old wife's tale but a myth – an utterance that reveals truth.

Accoardo demonstrates how the short story of Cupid and Psyche in the larger work of the *Metamorphosis* or *The Golden Ass*, is reflected or symbolized throughout the rest of the Lucius's story. In many ways Lucius is a Psyche looking for the divine and having to overcome hardship before he can reach it (50). Accoardo's analysis is consistent with other critics who have equated the tale of *Cupid and Psyche*, particularly Psyche's part of the story, to Lucius's career, "who, through lust and inquisitive meddling in magic, is transformed into an ass, endures misfortunes as he passes from owner to owner, and is finally saved by Isis" (Schlam 3). Schlam suggests that looking at monuments and other symbols in both tales one can see the connections and significance. Edwards in his study "The Tale of Cupid and Psyche", following a platonic form,

asserts that Psyche is the representation of the soul and its journey through trials to achieve and receive love (83).

Schlam explores the elements that have caused critics to confuse the Apuleius's version of *Cupid and Psyche* with folktales. Schlam is aware that there is evidence that "in reworking the story of Lucius, Apuleius changed the names of various characters in ways, which enrich the development of religious themes. The numerous parallels between the Apulian tale and the tradition of the Greek romances may indicate that Apuleius adapted a literary version of the folk tale" (34). However, Schlam believes that there is more at work in Apuleius's story. He argues that Apuleius initially "imbue[d]" the story of *Cupid and Psyche* with "allegorical meaning. His conception of love and the soul bears the impression of Platonism, but the philosophic motifs are made part of the broader themes of salvation. It is the monuments which provide the fullest evidence for the religious significance of Eros and Psyche" (34). The folktale elements of the *Cupid and Psyche* story are overturned, when the story is taken in its complete context as a story with in a story.

Apuleius was not just filling pages with a little side story. He was using the tale of *Cupid and Psyche* as a symbol to better understand the arduous journey that Lucius must suffer on his way to salvation and conversion to the goddess Isis. The whole story of the *Golden Ass* is about the journey of reconciliation and divine love, which is the same story that *Cupid and Psyche*'s story tells. Even though there are elements of other folktales in the Cupid and Psyche story, there are other details "which have no source in the folk tale tradition, may be interpreted as reminiscences of this Platonic 'myth'" that is Psyche is willing to become the slave in Venus's house because she is hoping to find her love there (Schlam 35). Regardless of whether the original story was a folktale, the story that Apuleius gave to the world is not. Myers implies that

the actual digression of *Cupid and Psyche* is a fairytale, which asserts an inconsistency (151). Myers, whether she realizes it or not by acknowledging the use of the digression in the medieval and ancient sense, is confirming the mythic quality of the work as a whole. Schlam agrees that Apuleius “transformed a folk tale into the literary centerpiece of his novel, and built into it elements of philosophic and religious allegory. He was able to do this by using a pair of figures whose symbolic significance was established by a long tradition of artistic representations” (40).

Even when dealing with *Cupid and Psyche* as a myth and not a fairytale, one must consider what Maria von Franz has to say. She introduces the story of Cupid and Psyche in her analyses of the *Golden Ass*, as a fairytale—a story within a story which is like a dream (77). However, her blunt statement about the story being a fairytale does not fit with her discussion of the story. Franz confirms once again that the Cupid / Psyche motif is a common one. Franz continues to use of Jungian analysis, asserting that the changes Apuleius made to the story were representations of “his own anima problem and preparing his initiation” (78). Apuleius was expressing himself in what he wrote just as much as Lucius’ journey is expressed in the tale of *Cupid and Psyche*. This interpretation of the tale borders on the realm of spiritual associations that are in alliance with Kirk’s definition of myth not fairytale.

When the tale of *Cupid and Psyche* is told in the guise of an old wife’s tale, Lucius is deeply impacted by it. It is only after he hears the story that Lucius take action:

Lucius decides to run away with Charite, so he gets at least an impulse to try to free himself and return to a more human life. There is one more important detail: Charite sits on his back when they run away together, and Lucius, with the excuse of wanting to scratch his neck, tries to kiss Charite’s feet. There one can see a tiny attempt on Lucius’s side to become Charite’s savior and lover, that is,

to replace Tlepolemus. Although this small attempt does not have any effect, one sees that the fairy tale [myth] has had a certain impact upon him. It has aroused the impulse of the conscious personality to enter the game and become involved. (Franz, *The Golden* 80).

Franz sees the connection between the story of *Cupid and Psyche* and what Lucius does; however, her conclusions are still based on the assumption that the story is a fairytale. As a myth, Lucius's reactions make much more sense. He sees the deeper meaning, at least on a subconscious level, and he wants to be a savior to the girl. He wants to be like Eros, the beast lover-god. But he is only a mortal goat and cannot succeed. But the desire in him was born out of the greater truth of the myth not a fairytale.

Franz analyzes the aspects of the divine natures and personalities of the gods and how they are a symbol of the soul. Using her Jungian theories, Franz explains the significance of Cupid i.e. Eros, who in some traditions is worshipped as a healer god:

Psychological healing always entails a widening of the personality. It brings more life and more aspects of the personality into activity ... A concept of the Christian theology illustrates this: the process of kenosis (from the Greek, 'to empty oneself,' 'to dispose'). It means that Christ (when he was still with the Father, before his incarnation, as Logos, the Johannine Logos) had the plenitude of the Father, the all-pervading oneness with the divine world, without definiteness. After that he emptied himself—'ekenose heauton,'—as Saint Paul writes—which means he emptied himself of his all-embracing plenitude and oneness in order to become a mortal. Man is heightened through the realization of the inner Christ (for instance, by getting Christian teaching), and Christ is lowered by his descent

into the human world. This is also expressed by his birth in the stable. (Franz, *The Golden* 87)

For Franz, the myth of Cupid and Psyche is similar to the Christian myth; it is a story of healing. This is why the god in the story has to be Cupid. He is divine healing and divine love. However, Franz does not necessarily see the truth behind Christ. Even though Lewis and other Christian critics of myths would agree with her impart, they would concede that her conclusions are wrong. Franz, oddly enough like the sisters in the Cupid and Psyche story, does not understand the meaning for the divine marriage, she misses the meaning of the mystery. Lewis understood this essential concept.

However, for all of Franz's short comings, she does understand the aspect of suffering. It is only when Psyche sees her divine husband that she "is no longer lost in the unconscious of a distant paradise of joy and death; rather, she awakens and behaves towards Eros like a loving partner. The personal love has taken the place of a purely collective pleasure principle, but exactly in this moment love becomes tragic" (Franz, *The Golden* 108). Unfortunately the moment that love overcomes Psyche, is the same moment that she disobeys the taboo placed on her. Because her love now is complete love, Cupid does the only thing that could and does cause her the greatest pain: he departs (107). This suffering is the suffering of the blind and the lost. Psyche must search in constant agony for the one she loves and lost. Her journey is the journey that all pilgrims searching for god must go through, at least that is according the meaning of the myth that Apuleius wrote. Lucius is a Psyche. The journey is the suffering of the soul trying to find love and acceptance.

Lewis's A Myth Retold

As has been noted, Apuleius's version is not the first to tell the myth, "by extension Lewis will not be the last or final person to tell it. Lewis retells Apuleius, mirrors him, just as Apuleius's story was derivative, a retelling of a more original story" (Schakel 165). Lewis, rather than seeing Apuleius as processor of the right version of the story, he "regard[s] Apuleius as the transmitter of the story, not its creator, and he felt 'quite free to go behind Apuleius'" (Clark 108). Lewis writes that from the first time he read Apuleius's version of Cupid and Psyche, he felt that "Apuleius got it all wrong. The elder sister (I reduce her to one) couldn't see Psyche's palace when she visited her. She saw only rock and heather... Hence her dreadful problem: 'is P.[Psyche] mad or am I blind?'" (Lewis, *Letters* 590). Lewis is clarifying what he thought was a great mistake on Apuleius's part in telling the story. In fact, in *Till We Have Faces* he uses a priest to tell the original story of Psyche, which is very similar to Apuleius's version. It is this story about the jealous sisters that drives Orual to tell her version of events, which is Lewis's version of the story.

Therefore, the theme of telling and retelling of the myth becomes "central to the 'form' that Lewis's novel takes" (Schakel 158). The art of telling the myth becomes part of the story itself, which coincide with Lewis's first and second definition of a myth. In the telling and retelling of a story meaning is manifested but only if it makes something. Lewis makes his point concerning the nature of Orual and Psyche that Apuleius missed when he focused on Psyche and not the sisters. In another one of his letters, Lewis clarifies that *TWHF* "isn't an allegory. I was trying to tell a story. The main themes are 1. Natural affection. If left to mere nature, easily becomes a special kind of hatred. 2. God is, to our natural affections, the ultimate object of jealousy" (Lewis, *Letters* 1090). The story is not necessarily about Cupid and Psyche, it is about Orual and her misplaced affections:

In short the book is about what the nature of a thing is—the god’s relations with man, Orual’s love for Psyche—rather than with what it does or becomes. It is essentially introspective: no other of Lewis’s novels is so preoccupied with its own past. Its concern is with ‘seeing’—imagery of which pervades the story—by which Orual may come to understanding what lay at the bottom of her love.

(Manlove 191)

It is a myth because Orual reveals the nature of the human condition and her response to God.

The truth that Orual learns is a transcendent, divine truth.

Myth is the narrative voice of humanity and Orual’s voice tells the story, not as the priests see it, not as the gods see it, but as she sees it. She is the human voice complaining to the gods because of their injustice to humanity. Her complaint though, particular is in a way universal. She wants the gods to speak to reveal themselves to her. Bardia discloses a similar desire the night before Psyche is sacrificed when he wonders if the gods know what it is like to be human (Lewis, *TWHF* 66). The human condition is something that even man does not understand. One of man’s greatest fear is that the gods themselves do not even know what it is like. Orual and Bardia fear the judgment of the gods for being human and making human mistakes when acting upon human knowledge. This is universal fear seen throughout other myths. Oedipus is one of the most tragic characters caught in this type of human misunderstanding. But he is not excused for his ignorance. His marriage to his mother was just as guilty as if he had done it knowingly. Therefore, Orual’s voice is the voice of humanity crying out for what mankind thinks is injustice from the gods.

Lewis is aware of the conceptions and archetypes that he was making and using. He explains in one of his letters;

What makes Orual different from the ‘warrior maiden’ Archetype is that she is *ugly*, represents virginity not [in] its high poetic state but as mere misfortune, and of course, masculine activities as the *pis aller*, the thing she is driven into because nothing else is left her. (A bit of ambivalence too. Bardia’s attempt to treat her as man is agony, yet also to be as much of a man as possible and share his masculine activities is the only thing that links her with him at all and is, in that way, precious to her). Even so, she does feel on killing her first man that she has somehow been debauched. (*Lewis, Letters 794*)

Orual struggles with identity, not because Lewis did not know how to use the archetypes but because Orual is more than just a stock figure. She has depth and meaning in her actions and arguments.

In many ways in Part One, Orual is a Medea or another tragic heroine who does not know how to behave or handle the situation that they find themselves in. Orual’s initial complaint is an accusation that the gods did this to her. All the pain that she feels and suffers is because they—Fate or the gods—were cruel. Orual sees herself as a victim. Orual loses the opportunity to be Iphigenia—to save her people by dying for them (Meyer 53). Orual wants to be an Iphigenia for Psyche but that is denied her. So Orual asserts that she “can be Antigone” (*TWHF 86*). She can go and bury and or “burn them righty” (87). Orual wants to be the tragic heroine of her own story. In this respect her desire to be a tragic heroine is like the wishing in a fairytale. Orual wishes to be the savior of Psyche. If she cannot be Iphigenia, then she will be Antigone. Even if that means being the one who has to kill Psyche, Orual will save Psyche from her predicament (Myers 74). However, the wish is never fulfilled because of divine intervention. Orual is never

given the chance to save Psyche because it is not her place to do so. It is the divine intervention that makes Orual's story a myth and not a fairytale.

Maria von Franz in her analysis of *The Golden Ass*, claims that Lewis's character of Orual and even Redival are merely "the shadow figure of Psyche" (93). This concept was already analyzed under the guise of fairytale; however it has more meaning when considered in the terms of myth. Orual is at least in the first part of the story only a shadow of the person she ought to be but Orual is much more complex. She struggles with her desires to love Psyche completely. She fears that Psyche is living a delusional fairytale and the only Orual can save her. Orual knows there is something holy about Ungit, but she cannot shake the stoic rationalism of the Fox. Her ugliness terrifies her, though she would never admit it. She covers herself to hide her nature and her emotions. She loves Psyche and loses her; she loves Bardia and can never have him. A character with so much thought and emotion is not a mere shadow. If anything Psyche appears to be a shadow of Orual.

Orual's self deception in Part One sets up the stories, giving it the needed qualities to translate the simple jealousy of Orual into a myth. In Part One all the events in Orual's life are according to how Orual perceives them or how they affect Orual. When Orual meets Prince Argan for the first time, "[t]he emphasis is not on him but on Orual's reaction to him" (Manlove196). Everything from the way her father looks to the way the earth smells are her thoughts and her feelings. The reader is given Psyche's explanation of the events in the valley, but they are filtered through the words and understanding of Orual:

She blames the gods when she should look into herself. Her complaint itself turns into something else, its own answer. Her feelings themselves in her complaint are in part misdirected and insubstantial: Psyche is to some extent an externalization

of what she feels (wrongly as it appears) she lacks in herself; her grief at the loss of Psyche is in this sense not grief over Psyche herself but over a renewed sensation of what she feels is her Psyche-less nature. At the end she learns that in another sense her grief was always unreal, for as the god promised her, “You also shall be Psyche”: she is the thing she thought she had lost...it expresses an inaccuracy of soul on the part of the teller Orual. (Manlove 196)

Orual’s understanding of the mystic events that transformed Psyche take time. She does not understand at first because she does not want to understand. When she hears Psyche’s version of events, Orual’s first response is not to believe her, because to do so would be to admit that Psyche was lost to her. The reality that Psyche is experiencing seems impossible (Gould 83). Orual is too distracted by what appears to be impossible to see the reality of it and it distracts her from experiencing joy for her sister. Orual knows nothing of love but that she desires it. Her wishing to be all things so that she could be with Psyche exemplifies it (Lewis, *TWHF* 23). She also feels the scorn of knowing that Bardia, the one man that she loves as much as she does Psyche, can only wish that she were a man. It is “only in later life, when one has experience the true and divine aspect, can one become immune to the cynical, inferior side of human relationships” (Franz, *The Golden* 93). This is one of the main themes in Lewis’s text—Orual had to learn through her own cynicism the value of divine love, forgiveness, and self-realization. It was not an easy process. But that is what the second part of the book is all about. However, Franz does not explain this. She jumps to a different type of conclusion about love and comes to the very limited conclusion that “the main figure in C. S. Lewis’s novel is, characteristically, one of the jealous sisters, and he tries to show that it was she who destroyed the first relationship of Eros and Psyche. She personifies the woman who refuses the love of the god” (94). Lewis did

not simply “try” to show, he demonstrated how Orual destroyed herself through over rationalization and over justification and self-love. Indeed Orual has romantic notions of love wrapped up in her idolization of Psyche, but it is a mask for her own self-love/self-loathing, which oddly enough are at times one and the same. The truth of the struggle is disclosed when Orual begins to understand the divine love and the truth about herself. She can then travel with Psyche in her dreams and carrying Psyche’s burdens to help reconcile Psyche to her husband. Orual experiences true love for Psyche and herself in the process.

In one respect Psyche is everything that Orual is not. Yet, as Lewis conceives her she is also very like Orual. This is where Franz’s analysis could fit, when she claims that Orual is only a shadow of Psyche. Lewis explains this relationship:

About Psyche herself... The attempt was precisely to show the biddable ideal daughter, Maia’s[Orual’s] little pet (the ideal object for a devouring maternal love, the live doll) turning into the sometimes terrifying, sometimes maternal, Goddess... I think she must have the same deep voice as Orual: for ‘you also are Psyche’. The whole thing is v. tricky, though. The numinous breaking through the childish mustn’t be made just like the mature breaking thro’ the juvenile; the traits of eternal *youth* have to come in” (*Lewis, Letters* 630).

However, as Lewis states the dichotomy between Orual and Psyche is tricky and not something that can be ignored or dismissed lightly. Psyche is “not merely ‘realistic’ and ‘down-to-earth’: there are hints about her from the start, not least in her exceptional beauty, however ordinary her parentage; and while she is thoroughly natural as a girl, she is innocent and pure” (Manlove 192). Orual notices her beauty and exceptional personality and cherishes her with a jealous love, while the people treat her with a type of reverence, which turns into worship (*Lewis, TWHF* 32).

Psyche is a mixture of all that is natural and spiritual about mankind. In the moment that the people call Psyche the accursed, “[t]he balance between her spiritual stature and her ‘everyday’ self is finely caught” (Manlove 192). While Psyche accepts what is natural and spiritual about the human condition, Orual continues to fight it.

Orual and Psyche reveal two aspects of man’s nature. Psyche presents what is proper and right. Her love for Orual and her husband are the proper sorts of love. She is not consumed by jealousy and hatred. She does not fear the people, even when their worship turns to scorn. Orual on the other hand, does not know how to love. She tries to understand the religion and holiness of Ungit, while trying to grasp the things of philosophers. She does not understand the mystery of love or of sacrifice. Orual only sees the blood, the pain, and the loss. Psyche sees the holiness, the joy, and the relationship.

One of the other aspects to Lewis’s retelling that make his story mythic is Ungit, the goddess. She is an Aphrodite, but a much more ancient, rustic form of her. The anthropologist would say that Ungit is a type of fertility goddess, a Venus of Lespugue, which Campbell describes as “not naturalistic; they are aesthetic compositions...The whole magic of the woman is brought here into one circle” (Campbell, *Transformations* 13). So too, is the statue of Ungit. She is not naturalistic but aesthetic not in a Greek way but in an earthy mystical way. She is the mother and the womb – the mystery that is life and birth. Ungit is old and immovable. She is a part of the earth and the people of Glome. Orual does not understand. She fears the blood and the smell of holiness (*TWHF* 45). Lewis deliberately contrasts Ungit with Aphrodite, particularly when the new priest puts her statue next to Ungit. The physical appearances of the goddesses not only represent their nature but how they are perceived in the mind of the reader and the people.

Ungit is a “the stone,” while Aphrodite is a statue. Every detail of Ungit is contrasted with a detail of Aphrodite:

The stone / the Statue: Billowy / Rigid , Indefinite / Definite, Ugly / Pretty-pretty, Suggestive of life / Dead as a Dutch doll, Dark / Light, Sexy / Only in the sense of trying to be pretty, Old / New, Barbarous / Thinks itself very civilised and up to date, Rising out of the Earth / On a pedestal, Living rock / Cut stone” (*Lewis, Letters 736*).

Ungit is a goddess of myth and mystery, while Aphrodite is a mockery of it. If Ungit is the myth, than Aphrodite is the cheap imitation, which is the fairytale. Aphrodite is just a physical being made to look like man’s notion of beauty and desire – she has no mystery. Even with the statue of Aphrodite standing in the light in the House of Ungit, “the formlessness of the goddess Ungit is more spiritually satisfying to her worshippers” (Manlove 212). Clearly the myth is more powerful.

Chapter 4: *Till We Have Faces: The Real Myth*

Myth is story, the voice of humanity. It is the meaning to the ritual or the explanation of the mystery of life. Reality and the truth of the human existence are revealed in myth. However, these are all things that myth does on a literary or structural level. As was noted in Chapter One, myth also has a personal affect. Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus were the first to identify myth and its meaning to the culture by not only what it presents but how it affects the audience when it is presented (Lewis, *A Preface* 6; Longinus 114). The ritual does not mean anything unless it has an effect on the participants. So, on the basis of this understanding, myth is no more than a story unless the readers are affected.

Lewis's Definitions and *Till We Have Faces*

When C. S. Lewis gives his definitions of myth in *Experiment on Criticism*, he focuses on the effect of the myth on the reader and less on the myth itself. Lewis understands that the imagination and understanding the experience of the mystery is what makes a myth a myth. Therefore, he is persuaded that not everyone will consider the same story as myth. Regardless of this assumption, Lewis is confident that there are certain elements that the myths all share, which make them a myth no matter how the reader perceives them. A myth, according to Lewis, has six traits. (1) It is extra-literary, meaning it is not limited to a particular genre. A myth can be a play, a poem, a short story, a novel, or an epic. The meaning does not change with the genre. It is the narrative shape of the story that has to remain the same through the different tellings (Myers 185). (2).The joy that one receives from a myth “depends hardly at all on such usual narrative attractions as suspense or surprise. Even at a first hearing it is felt to be inevitable” (Lewis, *Experiment* 43). The reader knows the ending but it is not so much the ending but the journey. There is something about the truth of the story that the reader wants to hear over and over again,

simply, for the pleasure of re-experience. (3) The reader does not “project [himself] at all strongly into the characters. They are like shapes moving in another world” (44). (4) Myth, just as Gould suggests, deals with the “impossibles and preternaturals” which is the fantastic (44). The world is real but the subject matter is about the things that are not of this world. (5) While the experience may be happy or sad, the myth is always grave. (6) A myth is always awe-inspiring. After the form has been stripped away and the allegories revealed, “the myth itself continues to feel more important than they” (44). The myth the story, the truth that is revealed through the veil of symbols and archetypes is more important than the mode. A myth will stay with the reader forever. Once it has been heard, there is no way to escape the power of the myth.

Doris Myers brings up an interesting question in her analysis: “Is a myth retold still a myth?” (183). Myers is not convinced that Lewis actually accomplishes “a myth retold.” Using Lewis’s own definitions, she argues each point and discusses whether or not he actually does those things with his novel. She also compares them to Apuleius’s version of the story. However, Myers does not consider all of her own points. She has already gone through a chapter by chapter breakdown of *Till We Have Faces*, and her own analysis of those chapters proved that Lewis was recreating a myth.

Lewis’s first definition looks at the narrative plot structure and the overall story. A myth is extra-literary. It is obvious that the story that Apuleius told and the story that Lewis told are structurally different. Apuleius put his story in the guise of an old wives’ tale to mask its myth qualities. Lewis embraced the voice of Orual and told the story as her complaint to the gods. Each story fits into a different genre as it were, but the story, the narrative structure could be “summarized in one or two sentences” (Myers 183). On this point Myers concedes that Lewis’s version does fit his definition.

The second definition involves how the narrative affects the reader. Lewis is convinced that it is not the suspense or the unknown that draws us it is the story itself. Myers correctly affirms that both the original story and Lewis's story have this element. Lewis reiterates in *A Preface to Paradise Lost*, "the unexpected tires us: it also takes us longer to understand and enjoy than the expected" (21). Even though this statement is directed to the aspects of oral poetry, when looked at in connection with *Till We Have Faces* one can see that Lewis took pleasure in this principle. *Till We Have Faces* is a retelling of a well known story. There are not too many surprises or unexpected events that require intense analysis, at least in the first part. In Part Two Lewis does let loose with the unexpected but he does so as a method of teaching, provoking the reader to learn the lessons that Orual he self needs to learn because of the new insights she is learning. But Lewis does not let this part of the book last too long. It is short and to the point and the conclusion comes just before the reader becomes too tired to carry on with any more surprises. Lewis leaves his readers thinking and contemplating the unexpected when all is written and done.

The reader is not surprised when Psyche leaves her love because she disobeyed. In Lewis's story the reader is clearly convinced that Orual is "living within a myth when she visits Psyche on the night before the sacrifice and sees her sitting on the bed with a lamp beside her. Though it was 'only in a flash' Orual says, 'the picture...is everlasting'" (184). Orual sees her life at least the most important parts of her life with a mythic mind set. This is revealed in how she talks about Psyche's sacrifice in the terms of Greek tragedy. Orual wants to hear those stories again, not because she finds them suspenseful but because they are predictable and they are comfort to her.

The third definition concerning the minimal amount of human sympathy that a myth invokes, is the part of Lewis's definition of myth that Myers is convinced that Lewis did not do in his story. She asserts that the "psychology of the characters is a major interest" in the story. The reader is drawn into the character of Orual and relates to her plight. Even though Lewis describes a myth as having impersonal characteristics, Lewis makes Orual a very real and believable woman. She is someone whose responses are personal and her argument against the gods persuades the readers to take her side. Lewis candidly describes Orual as "in a most perfectly ordinary, jealous, ravenous, biological fashion, in love with Bardia" (Lewis, *Letters* 707).

However, there is really nothing extraordinary or lovable about Orual. Because of this she becomes almost impersonal. Orual herself withdraws from having identity by veiling herself. She becomes faceless, genderless, and altogether withdrawn from human society on a personal level. The Orual that the readers identify with is the Orual who sits with Psyche on the bed the night before the sacrifice or the Orual that goes up to the mountain to save Psyche. But the Orual who is telling the story, queen Orual, the faceless Orual, rational Orual, has separated herself from that other Orual (*TWHF* 226). Orual is a paradox. She is completely personal and full of human sympathy. The reader identifies with her. Her voice becomes the reader's voice and yet in those moments Orual is also veiled. She has divorced herself from the normal experiences of the human existence resulting in a character that is impersonal. She is a woman who does not marry, does not have children, and does not have a family. Myers does not understand the complexity of Orual's function as a character in a story and as a narrator. This is how Lewis is able to both create a story that is universal and personal as well as keeping with his definition of a myth.

Myers constantly refers to *Till We Have Faces* as a realistic novel. By treating the “sister’s experience with the god of the Grey Mountain” as a real event, “though miraculous,” Myers believes that the “realness” of the event disqualifies the story from Lewis’s fourth criteria for myth (184). She asserts that by explaining the story as really happening takes away from the fantastic element, which Lewis says a myth must have. However, in that same breath Myers discredits Apuleius’s version of the tale from meeting this criterion because the fantastic elements are too ridiculous. Myers clearly is conflicted with her understanding of the fantastic. If the event is presented as real, then the fantastic element is only miraculous; but if the event is fantastic, then Myers finds the event ridiculous. There is no middle ground for Myers’s analysis, and she does not give a definition for what she means by fantastic, even though she discredits Lewis’s understanding. For Lewis, the realism of his story adds to the fantastic. In fact the moments that are, as Myers calls them, “miraculous” are the fantastic “impossibles” that Lewis requires a myth to have.

The miracles that happen in real life are the mysteries that myth through story explains. Myers completely misses the point on what is fantastic. She is so caught up in the notion that Lewis is telling his story through a modern realistic novel that she cannot see the mystery in Psyche’s marriage to the god or how the dreams that Orual experiences in the end of her life are more real than all of her day-to-day living ever was. These apparently abstract ideas of redemption and suffering are made concrete through the experiences of the dreams (Lewis, *God in the Dock* 66). Lewis knew that these fantastic elements of the story had to be real, because their reality is about that which is true (66). Without these miraculous moments, *Till We Have Faces* would just be another story with no mythic meaning whatsoever.

The fifth criterion for myth is the grave and serious aspect of the story. Therefore, Myers claims that the comic and ridiculousness of Apuleius's story disqualifies it. However, Myers is looking only at the story of Cupid and Psyche and not the whole work, and if she had done so, she would have known that even the bawdy and comic elements revealed a more serious nature that draws Lucius to Isis and make Apuleius's story is a myth, just as Lewis's story is.

Lewis's version, though it would appear to be completely tragic, is in a sense a comedy in the classical sense because of it concludes with a reunion. The story has a happy ending, but it is never once ridiculous or frivolous. The matter that Lewis is presenting is grave. Orual is writing her complaint to the gods, even though near the end she realizes the silliness of her words in the light of the greater picture, invoking a morbid shame in Orual.

Lewis's final criterion for myth is its ability to inspire. Myers describes this aspect, saying that "the feeling that 'something of great moment [has] been communicated to us' is due to the special kind of events found in a myth. The myth deals with universal anxieties, life crises, and choices, but by putting the story in a context of 'impossibles and preternaturals,' it involves the readers or hearers in meaningfulness far beyond the ordinary" (185). If Myers' understanding of what Lewis means concerning the awe-inspiring aspect of myth, than her pervious statement about *Till We Have Faces* not being a myth because it lacks the "impossibles" is false. She admits that even though the thoughts and fears of Orual and Psyche are in one respect ordinary, the fact that Psyche marries a god makes them extraordinary. And Orual's reaction to the events of her sister's marriage clearly indicates that there is more to life than just the choices and crises that she faces. All of Part Two and even the moment in the mist when she knows that she has seen Psyche's palace are proof that there is more to Orual's story.

Myers justifies her analysis by coming up with a new term, calling it a “mythic radiance” (185). Lewis’s story is not a myth because it does not fit his own definition, so it just has “mythic radiance,” that is to say a resemblance to mythic elements that still inspires and leaves the reading transformed. Granting all of that, Myers says *Till We Have Faces* is not myth. This is an unfortunate conclusion, because by her own admission there is no definition of myth (186). There is no true myth. However, this is not what Lewis meant when he said that “the same story may be a myth to one man and not to another” (*Experiment* 45). His definitions in *An Experiment in Criticism* are for the reader and how the reader perceives myth. If the reader hears a myth it will follow these six criteria.

Myers does not consider other definitions that Lewis has for myth. In *God in the Dock*, Lewis explains a concept of a true myth. He explains, “[w]hat flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always *about* something, but reality is that *about which* truth is),” therefore, myth is not solely based on the reader but on the text and what it portrays (66). Lewis argues that myth is the “isthmus which connects the peninsular world of thought with that vast continent we really belong to. It is not, like truth, abstract; nor is it, like direct experience, bound to the particular” (66). Had Myers looked beyond *An Experiment in Criticism*, she would have found that Lewis had a firm definition of myth that still encompasses the reader response. It is not a mythic radiance or a shadow of myth.

The myth of *Cupid and Psyche* is one of those myths that permeated Lewis’s imagination. Even before Lewis understood the importance of myth as he would later come to understand, he knew that the myth of *Cupid and Psyche* was something special. The myth had so moved Lewis that he had to rewrite it; he had to tell it again. In his younger years he attempted to rewrite the myth in a poem. He later attempted a play version but he had to abandon these two

earlier attempts because he could not articulate himself in the manner that he wished: “The fact that he abandoned two earlier versions, a play and a long poem, and chose instead ‘narrative’ suggest the importance of the particular form of *Till We Have Faces*” (Schakel 166). It was not until after his conversion to Christianity that he began to understand how myth is “divine truth falling on human imagination” (Lewis, *Miracles* 139). Understanding this completely divine aspect of myth, Lewis was able to recreate the myth of *Cupid and Psyche* and in a manner redeem the myth from the critics and those who tried to trivialize the true meaning.

Three Different Ways to Tell a Myth

Schakel points out that there are three different versions of Apuleius’s story in *Till We Have Faces*—Orual’s, Psyche’s and the Essur Priest’s. Each version of the story reveals an aspect of the story that the other versions leave out. This is because perspective clouds judgment. In each of these perspectives Lewis demonstrates his mastery of the myth, showing how myth effects the reader, which is Orual’s story; how it effects the participants, which is Psyche’s story; and how it effects spirituality, which is the priest’s story.

Orual is the main voice of all of the stories and it is her desire to set the record straight concerning the story. Orual uses her voice to take the reader through how he/she is supposed to feel about the myth. The reader thinks and feels what Orual thinks and feels. First, there is the human understanding of the events. Orual rationalizes all of her experiences. She introduces herself almost as an outsider (Meyer 13). She sets up the narrative of the myth and takes away the suspense because the reader knows how it is going to end—with Orual telling her story. All of Part One is Orual’s response to the two other versions of events that she has heard: “the story she could not believe (Psyche’s) or [the story she could not] accept (the priest’s)” (Schakel 161). This is her opportunity to defend herself.

Orual is convinced that she has been wronged. The reader is intended to feel that injustice. Her complaint is the universal complaint that the gods do not reveal themselves to man and yet they expect man to know and understand how and who the gods are. Orual is so convinced that she has been wronged that she cannot believe the words of wisdom from Psyche, the rational words from Fox, or the spiritual words from Bardia. Psyche tells her that she is safe and well, that her husband is the god of the Mountain. Her duty is to her husband, claiming "I am not my own. You forget, Sister, that I'm a wife" (*TWHF* 128). However, it is not that Orual has forgotten, but that she does not want to believe. She demeans Psyche's marital status by thinking of her as a whore. When Orual goes to the Fox for advice she is overcome by her passions concerning the welfare of Psyche so much so that she does not heed the stoic warning: "You are transported beyond all reason and nature. Do you know what it is? There's one part love in you and five parts anger, and seven parts pride" (148). Bardia's advice to Orual is that the "gods know better" (136). He is a god-fearing man and the notion that Psyche needed to be saved from the Brute or the god had not even entered his mind. Psyche was in the possession of the gods and there was no need to seek farther or disturb her. Yet Orual is so certain of her version of the events that she refuses to take the council given to her. She would rather destroy both their lives, than believe that Psyche is safe with her god-husband (Schakel 160).

The second version of the story is Psyche's. She is the participant in the myth from the beginning to end. Her birth is in a way initiation to the myth. The mother dies, leaving the girls all alone to figure out the mysteries of love, marriage, and the gods by themselves. Psyche becomes the means for which Orual can understand these things. Franz makes a connection between the Mother-daughter incarnations in the Psyche myth to the Father-Son incarnations in Christianity. That is to say that just as the Father and the son are one, so Psyche and

Aphrodite/Ungit are “two aspects of the same archetype” (103). Psyche is at once the daughter and sister and mother to Orual, which is an interesting twist on Orual’s desire to be those things for Psyche. Orual is angry with Psyche in their last interview before the sacrifice because Psyche is being the mothering type (*TWHF* 70).

When Psyche tells how the god saved her and made her his wife, Orual refuses to believe. Psyche tells the story as one who has seen the light, because she has. She can describe the palace because she has seen it, while Orual turns a blind eye. The joys that Psyche is experiencing are only shadows and wisps of wind to Orual because she has not experienced them herself. Everything that Psyche tells about her life with the god is more like a fairytale in Orual’s mind because the reality of it is too impossible for Orual to accept. Orual cannot see Psyche as anything other than a child; therefore, she cannot perceive Psyche as a wife and participating in the mysteries of womanhood.

The people want to believe that Psyche is the incarnation of Aphrodite. The people want a human deity, one that can relate to them and understand them, who can be human with them (Franz, *The Golden* 90). This is why there are myths such as Cupid and Psyche and the story of Lucius. The stories are an attempt for man to understand and draw near to their god/s. In the end of Lucius’s story he is converted to Isis. He would have not done so had he not gone through his trials like Psyche. Psyche, in Lewis’s interpretation, must suffer not necessarily to redeem herself but to redeem Orual. Orual could not and would not become Psyche, if Psyche had not first gone through the trials that separated her from her god-husband:

Orual, in tempting Psyche to disobey the god, scandalizes her by insisting that she imitate Orual’s own desire, which is essentially a narcissistic self-love (though warped by rivalry in to what looks more like self-hatred). That the temptation

succeeds might be seen as indication Psyche's weakness, but her choice is in the end a generous, sacrificial one that will eventually turn rivalry with Orual into a better sort of imitation. (Gruenler 256)

Psyche is a type of Christ, which is not to say that she is Christ, but that she processes those aspects that remind one of Christ. She is the innocent. She goes through the tribulations, so that the observers can understand the divine implications. Christ came, was incarnate and lived among us. He endured hardship and ridicule and suffered death, so that mankind could understand how to live. Psyche is not Orual's Christ in all of these respects, but she is a means to understanding the mystery of divine sacrifice and holy living.

The priest's version of the story is most like Apuleius's story. It is worth noting that Orual is greatly angered by the "misrepresentation" of the sisters. However, in her anger she misses the mythical or spiritual understanding of the story that he tells. When Orual asks if Psyche is "now wandering over the earth or has she already become a goddess," the poor priest can only answer "the sacred story is about sacred things... In spring, all summer, she is a goddess. Then when the harvest comes we bring a lamp into the temple in the night and the god flies away. Then we veil her. And all winter she is wandering and suffering" (*TWHF* 246). He understands the story in the context of the ritual. His story, even though according to Orual is full of falsehoods, gets closer to the spiritual truth behind Orual's blindness:

Rather than attributing the sacrifice to Psyche to human violence, the priest blames in on Ungit's envy of her beauty, just like Apuleius blames Venus' envy. Orual revealingly judges such envy to be childish, but what she most objects to is that the older sisters are said by the priest (as by Apuleius) to have seen the palace that Psyche shared with the god on the mountain until, out of jealousy, they

convinced her to violate his prohibition against looking at him. Lewis' carefully handling of the question of whether the palace is real, or rather in what sense it is real, and whether Orual sees it, is part of what makes the story mythopoeic in a positive sense... Though Orual's narration includes a brief vision of it, it is not visible to her normal senses, and in the story she decides she did not see it, it cannot be real and she must save Psyche from delusion by bringing her a lantern to expose whatever it is that comes to her by night. When Orual hears the priest's story, she rejects the idea that he is jealous of Psyche and maintains that she is an innocent victim of invisible gods. (Gruenler 253)

Jealousy blinds Orual and keeps her from truly loving, not only Psyche but herself as well. It is the priest's version that strikes Orual into action. His version is the one that stings the most because his words ring the truest in Orual's heart. His story, though completely veiled in the mystery of ritual give the first glimmer of spiritual hope. Psyche is reunited with her beloved and Orual is forced, for the first time, to be introspective about her motives and actions concerning Psyche.

Part Two is where the reader along with Orual learns the true nature of events. While Part One was Orual's misguided and selfish understanding of her life, Part Two is where the revelations take place and the reader experiences the transforming power of the myth right alongside Orual. Orual is finally able to get past her childish notions of Psyche, her jealousy and hatred. She is able to become a participant herself in the mysteries, which are for her the four stages of revelation. It is a spiritual journey into the self and soul.

First Orual is confronted with Reival, the sister with whom Orual always compared herself and blamed for all her unhappiness growing up (Meyer 118). Tarin comes and relates

Redival's version of events: "First of all Orual loved me much; then the Fox came and she loved me little; then the baby came and she loved me not at all" (*TWHF* 255). Orual is struck by how her behavior and own insecurities affected Redival. Redival was not the pampered little brat that Orual perceived her to be; she was a lonely girl looking for love. Since she was beautiful, she found the affection that she craved in the wicked tongued Batta and in the arms of soldiers, because Orual would not love her.

The second confrontation comes in the form of the death of Bardia. It is only at his death that Orual admits her long time love for the soldier but she cannot vocalize it to him, she can only pen it. But his death is only the catalyst, Ansit his wife is the one who forces Orual to acknowledge her twisted view of love. Ansit blames Orual for killing Bardia, "as a tree that is eaten away within" (*TWHF* 260). Selfishly Orual demanded that Bardia divide his time and devotion between his Queen and his wife. Orual only ever demanded from Bardia; she never gave of herself to him. This is partially because she put on the veil and ceased to be Orual to become Queen, but it is more because of her own self pity and hatred. She buries Orual in the form of the Queen not because she thinks it will make her a better queen, though ostensibly it does, but because she hates herself. She is ugly; she has lost the one woman she loved, Psyche; and she cannot have the one man she loves, Bardia. Ansit forces Orual to see that her love is a selfish love that consumes everyone around her including Orual herself (265).

Orual's third revelation is connected with Ungit. As Queen, she is expected to participate in certain rituals at the House of Ungit. It is in the spring and the time for "the rite of the Year's birth" (*TWHF* 268). The House of Ungit is shaped like an egg and Arnom the priest is dressed like a bird and after a nights vigil in the House he will knock on the main doors of the temple and break forth to symbolize birth and new life. After staring at Ungit's ugly earthy stone, Orual

asks, “Who is Ungit?” Arnom speaking more like a Greek explains that “[s]he signifies the earth, which is the womb and mother of all living things” (270). Ungit is the mystery that hides the vulgar. Orual is not entirely satisfied with this answer; however, she is about to get a fuller deeper meaning of Ungit in a dream.

With her father, whom Orual hated above all men, Orual starts to dig in her dream. This has often been considered a Jungian interpretation of diving into the soul. Orual goes deep into herself in this dream until the King asks, “Who is Ungit?” And Orual hears her own voice return, “I am Ungit.” This thought sickens her but the more she thinks about it she realizes that “I [she] was that Batta-thing, that all-devouring womblike, yet barren, thing. Glome was a web—I the swollen spider, squat at its center, gorged with men’s stolen lives” (276). Orual struggles with this for several days until she cannot take the thought of being Ungit any longer and she stands at the river to take her life. Here the god of the Mountain speaks to her for the second time. He reminds her, “You cannot escape Ungit by going to the deadlands, for she is there also. Die before you die” (279). Learning that she was Ungit meant that Orual had to come to terms with the ugliness of her soul. The reader following Orual’s thoughts in the first part of the book must know journey with Orual through the dream and to the river and come to terms with the ugliness in his/her soul as well. This is the myth and the mystery.

The fourth and final revelation comes to Orual in a series of dreams. These are the most fantastic elements of Lewis’s story. The dreams are part of a waking dreamlike state that takes place on a spiritual and emotion level. Yet these events are more real to Orual than the corresponding moments of her life—or at least that is how Orual perceives them (283). It is in these series of waking visions that Orual experiences the tribulations of Psyche. The god has cursed her saying you will be like Psyche. After realizing that she has been Ungit and that her

book is a silly confusion of jealousy and lies, Orual can now suffer with Psyche, which will bring Psyche to her beloved and Orual back to hers (Myers 128). After all the years of having faulty love and looking at the world through her selfish conceptions of injustice, Orual lays bare her face and her soul before the gods and confess her sins before the divine judge. And she understands that the god of the Mountain is the answer (*TWHF* 308). Her admission of this is her last act and her final confession of faith. She is redeemed by the mysteries of that statement. So is the reader, if he/she takes to heart what Orual has gone through, will experience vicariously the mystery of becoming Psyche.

The True Myth

Orual starts her book with a complaint to the gods. She ends her book with a self reference to the complaint, saying “I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer” (*TWHF* 308). Her words do not make sense in and of themselves. Orual understands the answer because like Psyche she has become a participant in the myth. However, it is interesting that Orual starts out with gods and ends with god. Psyche’s god-husband is the mystery. He is the answer to the complaint.

The god of the Grey Mountain is most revealed in Orual’s statement that *he* is the answer, but in that same moment he is most hidden. Manlove points out that the god “comes in to act on Orual” when he has been completely blocked out from her (210). The first time is the night Psyche looks in on him in which she is sent into exile (*TWHF* 173). His speech discloses to her that she is to be Psyche. The second time the god comes and intervenes on Orual’s behalf is the night Orual tries to drown herself. It would be more accurate to say that Orual does not so much as try to kill herself as she stands at the river’s edge and contemplates how much she loathes the idea that she is Ungit. The god tells her to “Die before you die” (279). In both

instances he reveals his voice to Orual. Yet his words are cryptic and seem to ask more questions than they answer. However, in this second meeting Orual begins to understand that “the voice of the god had not changed in all those years, but I had. There was no rebel in me now.” (280).

From this point on, Orual goes on to experience the mystery through the revelation’s final dream.

Manlove argues that Lewis gave all his characters personality excepting one—the god. At first this may seem strange since, the reader is left without a doubt that the god is the deity Cupid. Yet in *Till We Have Faces* he “is a great golden figure of light who ‘appears’ once briefly and terribly, to Orual on the mountain” (194). This is a deliberate “de-Christianization” of the god “so that he [Lewis] can present the basics of human experience without benefit of clear supernatural intervention” (201). By doing this, Lewis is able to create a myth that will for shadow what he calls the “Perfect Myth and the Perfect Fact” (*God on the Dock* 67). The god of the Grey mountain “is not merely ‘pagan’, he is one with the nature of Christ without being lost in any simple identification—golden with life as Pythian Apollo, yet in no way whim-led, a being who sums the essential supernatural fabric and law of being” (Manlove 211). He is at the same time Ungit’s son and not Ungit’s son. He is the sky and all things that are light and yet he is more than that. He is Love, both in a pagan sense and in the *Divine Comedy* sense.

The readers of *Till We Have Faces* are left with the cryptic confession from Orual that her complaint was not truly against the gods but *the* god. Lewis is not trying to create a stumbling block in our understanding of Christ but attempting to give a fuller meaning of who Christ is in a pre-Christian world. He does not detract for the nature of God but exposes the nature of God in a basic sense. “Die before you die,” is a reference to the Christian principle of denying yourself and taking up your cross. The truth is in both statements, the former is easier to understand in a non-Christian context. The god of the Grey Mountain is supposed to be

ambiguous, to reveal too much would be to destroy the mystery; and in destroy the mystery the truth is lost.

While Orual's narrative follows Lewis's definition of myth from *An Experiment in Criticism*, Psyche's incarnation, as well as the god's, confirms Lewis's definition from *God in the Dock*. One definition is for the reader to understand and experience the myth. The other is for the genre as a whole to understand and experience not only the pagan myth but the true myth, which is the Incarnation of Christ. Orual experienced the truth of this myth. As she let the myth transcend her thought, the incarnation, as is understood and seen in the transformation of Psyche, the myth transcends into reality, and Orual is Psyche.

Concluding Remarks

Literary criticism has come a long way to enhance understanding about fairytales and myth. However, the critics have made some serious misconceptions about myth in the process. Using a classical tale of *Cupid and Psyche*, one can see not only how the flow of storytelling has changed the story, but how critics have judged and label the story in an attempt to better understand the context of the story.

Critics such as Zipes, Anderson, and Lang prove that the story of *Cupid and Psyche* is far older than the story that Apuleius wrote. There are several versions of the *Cupid and Psyche* story in multiple cultures and languages, which all focus on marriage, a taboo, the breaking of the taboo, suffering, and then reconciliation. However, Apuleius, being the first to write the story, is credited with canonizing his version of events. The story has then been told throughout time and cultures, manifesting itself in various genres from myth to folklore to fairytale.

Apuleius's version of *Cupid and Psyche*, if analysed solely as an independent story, is clearly a fairytale. It is told in the style of a fairytale; following the pattern of the old wives' tell. Apuleius uses the motif of the old wives' tale by having the old nurse tell the story. The story does not start out with the modern "Once upon a time," but his "there once was a King" follows the same concept. The story fits Bottigheimer's definitions of the "rise" and "restoration" fairytales and utilizes the archetypes of Jungian criticism. The generic and familiar style and voice of the story is everything that has become identified with fairytales.

Nevertheless, as Myers points out, the story is a digression, which is a particular motif used to parallel the larger story. When a reader looks at *Cupid and Psyche* not as a separate story in a larger one, but seeing it as part of the whole, the meaning changes. *Cupid and Psyche* does not lose any of its fairytale qualities but it gains many more qualities. As a parallel story,

Psyche's story becomes an allegory or shadow of the events that happen to Lucius. In fact the reader cannot understand Lucius's events leading up to his conversion to Isis without having first heard the story of *Cupid and Psyche*. In this sense, Apuleius's story becomes more than a fairytale. It is a myth. *Cupid and Psyche* is a literary symbol for the spiritual and ritualistic journey that Lucius goes through. Psyche's reunion with her god-husband is man's reunion with his god-creator.

The question that critics struggle with is whether it is a fairytale or a myth. More recent criticism, such as Bottigheimer's, oversimplifies the issue by labeling myth as a sub-category to fairytales, while other critics like Maria von Franz speak of the story as a fairytale but clearly mean myth. The answer is much more complicated; the *Cupid and Psyche* story can be both. As the story progressed from one telling to another, it changed. Mostly the story became more common and the mythic elements—the spiritual symbolism, the ritual, the reality of the truth that it conveyed—was lost and replaced with moral teaching and political or social convention. These replacement tales have become the fairytale versions modern readers are more familiar with, such as *Beauty and the Beast*. There is nothing mythic about *the Beauty and the Beast* story. It is all fairytale, which as a fairytale it is very good. But it is not a myth and those who try to say that it is have missed the point about myth and fairytale.

This change from the myth to the fairytale is not a negative aspect of telling stories. Zipes is correct in asserting that such transitions are not only inevitable but that they help grow and strengthen cultures and cultural identity. However, the shift from myth to fairytale does not mean that the original story was only a fairytale either, nor does it mean that the story cannot be told again using the mythic elements.

Lewis's version of Cupid and Psyche in *Till We Have Faces* demonstrates that a myth turned fairytale can still be told as a myth. Just as Apuleius's version was enhanced by the use of fairytale motifs, so Lewis also uses some of the elements in his story to add to the richness of it. Also, there are certain aspects of fairytale and myth that are necessary for both stories to function. The Jungian concept of the archetype is not a fairytale-only motif. However, as Franz expounds upon the archetype, she shows how it translated into the realm of the mythic when she talked about how Apuleius and Lewis used the character of Psyche as incarnations of the god. The divine revelation is not part of a fairytale, but a part of myth.

Lewis retells the classical story using fairytale elements when he chooses to, but only when they enhance the process of telling the myth. Myers and Gruenler do not understand that the use of fairytale elements does not make the story a fairytale. They both think that Lewis had somehow misinterpreted his own work when he called it a myth retold. However, to say that is to miss the greater meaning behind *Till We Have Faces*. Part II is all about the revelation and the unveiling of the myth so that Orual and the reader may become participants in the myth or ritual of the god of the Grey Mountain. Lewis is not writing a story about a peasant girl who marries a beast, though in some respect that is the story; he is telling about the divine truth of man's relationship to god.

While Beauty and the enchanted Prince/Beast in *Beauty and the Beast* wish for true love and, in the case of the beast, to be human again, Orual struggles with understanding greater love—not the love of man and woman, sister and sister, father and daughter, but the divine love of sky and earth, god and man. She struggles with the nature of herself and of the god. Fairytales are the wishes of the here and now. Their characters long for a transformation of the physical world into one of perfection and idealism. It is all about wishing. Myths are an imaginative

expression of the real, the condition of man. They long for the transformation of the spiritual world so that man can know and understand reality as it is and how it should be. Reality does not rely on wishing. Just because the events in a myth are imagined does not make them any less real, which is the opposite of all the wishing in a fairytale. In a fairytale the wishing makes it true; in a myth what is true transforms the wishing or the desire. As is seen with Orual, when she finally stops wishing and starts to see the world around her as it really is, her desire changes. She desires not to have the human love of Psyche but to have the divine love of the god. Lewis takes the pagan myth and after so many years of banal telling, he redeems the story. He once again captures the light of imagination as the true myth inspires him.

Lewis's version of the story does not fit the modern critics' definition of myth because the critics have trivialized it. Bottigheimer and Zipes do not see the transcendent meaning of myth. Bottigheimer sees only magic and make-believe and Zipes a social struggle. Lewis understands that myth has the power to reveal truth and knowledge. Myths do not fit in fairytale criticism, for as the analysis of *Till We Have Faces* has proven; the criticism used for fairytales leaves the stories wanting. Though fairytales and myth share many common elements—plot structure, characters, symbols—how they present these element is completely different. By lumping these two genres into one category, critics have missed the meaning and purpose of myth, a mistake that C. S. Lewis happily did not make in *Till We Have Faces*.

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